By Nergis Demirkaya
Debate is underway over how the political balance will shift after the “Framework Law,” which establishes the legal basis for the PKK’s disarmament process, passed the 600-seat parliament with a record 467 votes. The overwhelming support for the law is expected to whet the government’s long-standing appetite for a “new constitution.” But is that possible before the general election, now 20 months away if held on schedule?
During the eight years under the presidential system, which deepened the divide between the government and the opposition, parliament had never witnessed such broad consensus. The law received support from all other opposition parties despite some defections, with only the nationalist İYİ Party opposing it outright.
Although the Yeni Party cast the highest number of “no” votes, the government took the party’s institutional position into account. A senior politician who helped architect the process within the AKP said: “We do not look at how individual lawmakers voted. What matters to us is that the Yeni Party, as an institution, said ‘yes’ to the proposal.”
The Yeni Party’s vote was particularly important for the DEM Party, which has entered into various forms of electoral cooperation with the opposition in the past three elections. A senior DEM Party official said the stance would cause some disillusionment among the party’s voters but that there was still time to repair the damage. “Our voters will take note of this ambivalent position, but there is still much work to be done. We need one another in the struggle for democracy,” the official said.
A MIDDLE WAY: KEEPING EVERYONE ON BOARD
It was clearly not an easy decision for the Yeni Party, which has faced a series of crackdowns over the past two years. A “yes” risked completely alienating nationalist voters, while a “no” risked losing Kurdish voters. A middle way was found that would avoid upsetting either side or placing the lawmakers who joined the Yeni Party in a difficult position.
The party sought to break the deadlock through a “hybrid” model that Özgür Özel described as “an example of a new generation of politics.” On one hand, its right to oppose the law in response to unlawful government operations was not placed above the nation’s right to peace. On the other hand, its “no” votes did not signal wholesale opposition to the process, as İYİ Party’s did. Instead, they amounted to a “warning” vote reflecting distrust of the government’s practices. Yeni Party officials believe the stance will not have a major impact on Kurdish voters because it does not constitute outright opposition to the process. They expect this stance to be better understood over time.
The vote damaged but did not destroy the opposition’s quest for unity. That picture could change, however, if the government treats the process as leverage for a “new constitution.” Indeed, some have already begun describing the law as “a dress rehearsal for the constitution.” But will the AKP open that door?
The AKP has made no secret of its promise of a “new, civilian constitution” since the 2023 elections.
“We have focused on the process. This law was important,” an AKP politician said. “Its passage with more than the 400 votes required for a constitutional amendment is highly significant, but it would be premature to conclude that this will immediately translate into constitutional change.”
CONSENSUS REMAINS DIFFICULT
It is impossible to say at this stage that the government will immediately press the button on a new constitution. Although the numbers may make the prospect of amending the constitution without a referendum — with the support of the DEM Party and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP following his return to office after the absolute-nullity ruling — appear attractive, it is not a plan that can easily be put into practice.
The government must first make good use of the considerable political credit extended to the “Terror-free Turkey” process and deliver its intended outcome. Completing the PKK’s dissolution process alone will clearly not be enough. The DEM Party is seeking changes to the constitutional definition of citizenship, stronger local governments and guarantees concerning the mother tongue. The CHP wants changes to the presidential system. Meanwhile, there is little prospect of the Yeni Party, which struggled even to support the law governing the process, entering a constitutional debate. For that reason, even if the process proceeds smoothly, finding common ground on a new constitution will not be easy.
Despite these differences, expectations are high that the AKP will put a “new constitution” on the agenda when the new legislative year begins in October. One reason is the emergence of renewed hope for consensus; another is the need to present the public with a concrete proposal on a constitution promised for the past three years. In other words, even if a new constitution cannot ultimately be enacted, it is likely to become one of the AKP’s most tangible campaign pledges ahead of the approaching election.
