By Nergis Demirkaya
The PKK’s disarmament, which has now stretched beyond a year and a half, has stalled at precisely the most critical stage — the point at which the state is expected to take action.
Unless the government softens its precondition that “the disarmament process must first be fully completed,” the expected legal steps will likely be postponed until the new legislative year in October. The risks posed by delay are being discussed and meanwhile it also appears set to derail the transformation plans of the DEM Party, which has already started the countdown to a congress.
The disarmament of the PKK has become a major threshold in efforts to resolve Turkey’s fundamental problem, the Kurdish issue. The third bid for peace under the AKP has now entered the most critical phase. The PKK, which dissolved itself and symbolically demonstrated its commitment to disarmament through a weapons-burning ceremony, is now awaiting legal steps that would pave the way for “reconciliation with the state and integration with society.”
Should these legal measures be taken, members of the dissolved organization, the PKK, would begin descending from the mountains to the plains. Politicians currently in prison — including former HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ — could be released, while many political figures who left for Europe due to convictions linked to the PKK, from Osman Baydemir to İdris Baluken, could also come home.
A CONGRESS OF TRANSFORMATION FOR THE DEM PARTY
At such a critical moment — and under a legal obligation as well — the DEM Party has decided to convene a major congress. The congress, planned for September or October, is intended to reposition the party in line with the political climate after the PKK’s dissolution and disarmament. The congress was also envisioned as a broad reassessment of party policies and organizational structures, culminating in a strengthened leadership that would include figures returning to politics as part of the peace process. Yet delays in the timetable for the legal steps now appear likely to derail those plans entirely.
IF NO LAW EMERGES, LEADERSHIP POOL SHRINKS
Had legislative work begun immediately after parliament’s joint report was adopted, “returns home” could have started within six months to a year. But that did not happen.
Even if a law is passed before parliament enters its summer recess at the end of July, few believe meaningful results could emerge within just two months. Under such circumstances, the new leadership to be elected at the DEM Party congress in September or October will have to come from the party’s existing ranks. A DEM Party Central Executive Board member told Turkey in Depth that the delay in drafting legislation would also delay the targeted renewal of party cadres, adding that if the process succeeds, the real transformation may only come at the congress to be held two or three years later.
DOES AKP WANT A STRONGER DEM PARTY?
Considering that Turkey is expected to head toward general elections in the autumn of 2027 at the earliest, or spring 2028 at the latest, another question inevitably arises: how strong of a DEM Party does the AKP actually want? Suggesting that legal steps are being delayed for this reason may be too speculative, but it is increasingly evident that the slowdown in the process is unlikely to work in the DEM Party’s favor.
With support nearing 10 percent, the DEM Party occupies a kingmaker role, since it has the capacity to help whichever bloc it supports secure victory. The party played a decisive part in pushing the opposition’s vote share close to 48 percent in the last election, making its position in the next race especially significant. The leadership to emerge from the DEM Party congress this autumn, at the latest by the end of October, will not only shape the party’s future direction but also lead it into the elections. That team will have to make critical decisions on electoral cooperation, alliances, and relations with both the government and opposition parties.
A senior DEM Party official, speaking on condition of anonymity to Turkey in Depth, commented: “Our stance in an election to be held in or before 2028 will become clear only after new policies, a renewed organizational structure, and new cadres emerge. More importantly, our approach will ultimately be shaped by developments in the process itself.” In other words, the party avoided giving any firm signal.
MHP ALSO HEADS TO A CONGRESS
Meanwhile, another crucial congressional process is unfolding. The MHP will hold its grand congress on March 7, 2027 — ten months from now. Following the resignation of Deputy Chair İzzet Ulvi Yönter and the dissolution and reappointment of 11 provincial party organizations, the party is experiencing what insiders describe as a “silent storm.” MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli is expected to run again, yet the congress is also anticipated to feature sweeping changes that could signal preparations for the post-Bahçeli era. The “Terror-Free Turkey” process is expected to be one of the central agenda items at the congress.
Within party circles, there is growing discussion that if developments in the process do not unfold as Bahçeli hopes, there could also be consequences at the congress itself. Although the MHP is firmly leader-driven, unease over the process exists among the party base, and the failure of Bahçeli’s initiatives to produce tangible results could trigger internal questioning.
Turkish politics is powered by the fierce rivalry between the AKP and the CHP. Yet neither of these major parties can secure victory alone; both require alliances with smaller actors. In this respect, the congress processes unfolding within the DEM Party and the MHP — described by some as “keys” and by others as “kingmakers” — deserve particularly close attention.
