By (R) Ambassador Cengiz K. Fırat
The Eastern Mediterranean has always been shaped by the interplay of northern and southern powers. From the time of the Hittites and Ancient Egyptians to the Ottomans and Mamluks, and through to the present day, control or influence over this region—from Mesopotamia to North Africa—has often rested with one or the other. When Turkey and Egypt were aligned, a degree of order and stability was possible. When they clashed, chaos ensued. History shows us that these two centers of power matter—and they still do today.
In the present geopolitical landscape, the Eastern Mediterranean is again a focal point of global and regional contestation. Iran and Israel actively intervene in the region’s affairs—politically, militarily, and through proxies—often worsening conditions on the ground. Global powers like the U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser but growing extent China, all have stakes here. Former colonial actors like Britain and France still hold influence in parts of the region, often subtly and selectively. Amid this complex web, two regional actors—Turkey and Egypt—stand out, not just by virtue of history but because of their enduring capacity and centrality.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Turkey and Egypt are the two most populous nations in the region, both with deep-rooted traditions of statehood, large and young populations, and significant, if currently fragile, economies. They are both Sunni-majority states, with no direct territorial or ideological confrontation between them. Strategically, they control the chokepoints and trade arteries of the region: the Bosphorus and the Suez, the Anatolian corridor and the Sinai gateway. They are, quite literally, the gates of East-West and North-South connectivity—commercially, diplomatically, and militarily.
Yet, their paths have diverged at times. Political misalignments, external pressures, and regional competition have prevented meaningful cooperation over the last decade. This has come at a cost—not only for them but for the broader region. Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine have suffered deeply from the absence of coordinated regional leadership. Iran has exploited these gaps. Israel has moved unilaterally. Fragmentation has become the default.
Meanwhile, smaller regional actors attempt to fill the void. Greece, once a historic player in the Eastern Mediterranean, is attempting to reassert itself by aligning with Israel, the Greek Cypriots, and occasionally Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. But these partnerships often operate under the strategic umbrellas of the U.S. or the EU, and rarely develop true regional agency. What appears as alliance-building often serves to deepen polarization, not reduce it.
CHANCES OF COLLABORATION
The truth is that no alliance in the region can offer the authenticity and heft that a Turkish-Egyptian alignment can. Their joint leadership would be rooted not in external interests but in shared geography, historical responsibility, and overlapping interests. Their collaboration could be transformative.
Turkey, with its strong defense industry and NATO experience, can contribute to Egypt’s modernization efforts in military procurement and joint defense strategy. Egypt, with its energy production capacity—especially in natural gas—could work with Turkey on joint energy transportation and infrastructure projects that benefit both sides. Economically, both countries face challenges but also share opportunities. Coordinated strategies could stabilize markets, boost regional trade, and reduce vulnerability to foreign leverage.
Perhaps most importantly, both countries can work together to calm the crises in the region. In Libya, where both have supported opposing factions in the past, we are already seeing signs of quiet convergence. In Syria, Egypt’s pragmatic stance may balance Turkey’s strategic depth. In Palestine and Lebanon, where external powers have long manipulated divisions, Turkish-Egyptian diplomacy could offer new avenues for de-escalation and reconstruction.
Of course, not everyone would welcome this. Many external actors benefit from a divided Eastern Mediterranean. Neither Iran nor Israel would want to see their regional freedom of maneuver constrained by a coherent, balanced, and independent axis of Turkey and Egypt. Western powers may prefer the region to remain dependent on external security guarantees. But if Ankara and Cairo can look past short-term disagreements and focus on long-term strategic alignment, they may succeed in shifting the regional balance on their own terms.
Ultimately, this is a test of strategic imagination. Both countries have long traditions of realpolitik and statecraft. If they can summon that historical depth once more and act with vision, the Eastern Mediterranean—and indeed the broader Middle East—might finally move toward a more stable, multipolar, and locally-driven future.
Signs of hope are already there. Developments in Libya and Syria suggest that a new chapter may be beginning. The next steps will require courage, coordination, and clarity of purpose.
The region is watching—and waiting.
