By Nergis Demirkaya
This marks the third attempt to persuade the PKK to lay down arms during the AKP’s 23-year rule.
Following the failed Oslo talks (2009–2011) and the 2013–2015 “Peace Process,” this new initiative appears closer to achieving its goal than previous efforts. The PKK’s early decision to dissolve and disarm, along with its recent announcement of a full withdrawal from Turkey, underscores that progress.
Yet President Erdoğan — who once declared he would “drink hemlock for peace” — seems notably less enthusiastic this time. His caution stands in stark contrast to the energetic, boundary-pushing rhetoric of MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli.
This has fueled questions such as “Is there tension between the AKP and the MHP?” and “Why is Erdoğan being so cautious?” Conversations within both parties point to striking interpretations that all seem to converge on one explanation: everything hinges on the upcoming elections.
CAUTION FROM BITTER EXPERIENCE
Many politicians close to Erdoğan confirm that he is keeping his distance, attributing this to past failures.
One AKP insider summarized it as follows: “The President isn’t resisting, but he is cautious. He was the original initiator of the Kurdish opening. He believed in those processes deeply and wanted them to succeed. He had high hopes, especially for the 2013–2015 period. But he didn’t get what he wanted. He is angry with both the PKK and the Kurdish political actors of that period. His trust was broken. He does not want to experience the same disappointments. So, naturally, he is more sensitive, distant, and cautious now.”
FEAR OF POLITICAL COST
Another major reason for Erdoğan’s caution is the potential political cost if this process fails.
Erdoğan, who is expected to re-run in a presidential election in or before 2028, does not want an outcome that could weaken him in the eyes of voters. Therefore, he prefers to act not as the sole owner of the process, but as its facilitator. Through the parliamentary commission — which includes all parties, especially the CHP — he aims to share responsibility across the political spectrum.
ERDOĞAN WEARS TWO HATS, AND HIS PRESIDENTIAL ROLE BINDS THE STATE
Under the presidential system, Erdoğan wears two hats: President of the Republic and Chairman of the AKP. But his presidential identity — representing the state — is always dominant. Another party insider notes: “Bahçeli can act more freely. But every word Erdoğan utters binds the state. Every statement is interpreted as the state’s stance. Developments are closely watched around the world. His words do not carry the same weight as other politicians. His distance from the process must also be understood in this context.”
ERDOĞAN HAS NOT UTTERED ÖCALAN’S NAME FOR A YEAR
Erdoğan has offered no details on the “Terror-Free Turkey” process, which he calls a “state project.” He has avoided all public debate on issues such as the return of PKK members, Öcalan’s right to hope, the commission’s İmralı visit, or the Dissolution Law that the Turkish Parliament is expected to adopt.
Records show that since the process began in October 2024, Erdoğan has not once mentioned Abdullah Öcalan by name, preferring instead to say “İmralı.” This silence is particularly notable given Bahçeli’s recent remark: “If necessary, I will speak with Öcalan myself.”
There is an explanation for this among AKP members: Polls show that public support for a ‘Terror-Free Turkey’ stands between 70–85 percent. But when the issue involves Öcalan, that support drops to as low as 25 percent. Erdoğan wants to help the process, but he is also careful with his rhetoric to avoid creating political vulnerabilities for himself.
THAT PHOTO ERDOĞAN WANTS TO AVOID
Erdoğan agreed for a parliamentary delegation to visit Öcalan only after evaluating it for a long time, according to party insiders. Despite clear assessments that such a visit would advance the process, Erdoğan reportedly hesitated due to “photo anxiety.”
During the first peace process, the lasting public image became that of 34 PKK members entering Turkey at the Habur border gate.
In the second, it was the Dolmabahçe photograph showing AKP officials and HDP heavyweights at the same table. A photograph of Öcalan with members of the parliamentary commission will undoubtedly mark this process as well. The need to plan the İmralı visit carefully so that it does not create damaging visual memories is said to be one reason for the delay.
All these assessments from AKP and MHP circles reveal just how carefully Erdoğan is navigating the run-up to the next elections, normally scheduled for 2028. The picture is clear: Erdoğan wants to avoid bearing any political cost should the process fail. Under these circumstances, the CHP — the main opposition and a potential governing party — also appears more justified in its own caution and distance.
