By Mühdan Sağlam
The war that erupted on Feb. 28, between Iran, the U.S. and Israel has sparked deep global uncertainty, as Iran targets U.S. bases and strategic energy infrastructure across the Gulf.
Under normal circumstances, the narrow Strait of Hormuz carries 20 million barrels of oil and 330 million cubic meters of LNG gas daily. Yet Hormuz is more than an energy corridor — it is also a bridge through which refined petroleum products, petrochemical derivatives and critical inputs extracted from natural gas in the Gulf reach the rest of the world.
Beyond the closure of the strait itself, the targeting of production facilities, refineries and ports amplifies the pressure and risks prolonging the crisis for years. In this context, examining the critical goods supplied by Gulf countries — and their place within the Turkish market — offers a clearer picture of the risks facing Turkey’s economy in the short and medium term.
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz does not merely disrupt crude oil supply; it shakes the refined products and petrochemical networks. Maritime trade data shows that 30% of naphtha and condensate, 20–25% of diesel, and 15–20% of gasoline pass through this narrow corridor. As of March 2026, the shutdown has created a massive bottleneck stretching from petrochemical plants in Asia to industrial giants in Europe. The fact that 43% of global polyethylene exports — the backbone of plastics — are produced in this region, with 84% passing directly through Hormuz, makes rising manufacturing costs inevitable. A one-day 10.6% spike in methanol prices, and the risk to one-third of global helium supply (from Qatar), underscore that this strait is in fact one of the most vital arteries of global technology.
Besides industry and technology, nearly one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade passes through Hormuz, pushing up urea prices — critical for farm productivity. Analyses suggest that if the strait remains closed and production disruptions persist, the global fertilizer supply chain could shrink by 33%. This could trigger food security crises, particularly in developing countries. Considering that 35–40% of global bitumen exports and 8–10% of aluminum production also originate from this region, a prolonged blockage in Hormuz may drive up global logistics costs, disrupt construction, and generate a multi-layered surge in consumer inflation alongside severe supply chain fragmentation.
IMPACT OF HORMUZ CRISIS ON TURKEY
So what is unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz is not merely about rising energy costs for Turkey; it represents a bottleneck in access to strategic raw materials and intermediate goods.
From an industrial perspective, Turkey imports a large proportion of aluminum and plastic raw materials from Gulf countries. Aluminum imports, approaching $1 billion annually, account for 10–15% of total volume, while 12–13% of plastic raw materials depend on the Saudi Arabia–Qatar–UAE corridor. Qatar’s 20% share in helium supply — indispensable for defense and medical technologies — turns this narrow passage into a strategic vulnerability for Turkey’s industrial security. Beyond that, the fact that 40% of monoethylene glycol (MEG) imports — the core input of Turkey’s textile and ready-to-wear exports — relies on this route creates significant cost pressure on an export volume worth $30 billion.
INPUT SHOCK ON AGRICULTURE
In agriculture, the crisis is transforming into an input shock that fuels food inflation. Nearly 15–25% of the nitrogen-based components in Turkey’s annual fertilizer consumption — approaching 7 million tons — originate from the Gulf.
After contracting by 8.8% in 2025, the agricultural sector now faces a renewed risk of decline as oil prices settle in the $100–120 range as of March 2026 and fertilizer shipments falter. Faced with a 45% monthly surge in urea prices, Turkey has halted urea exports and reduced import duties to zero.
While these measures aim to safeguard domestic supply, two factors strain this strategy: rising freight and insurance costs, and the suspension of exports by major suppliers such as Russia due to their own domestic market pressures.
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AWAIT TURKISH EXPORTERS
The surge in insurance and freight costs will weigh heavily on Turkey’s external trade expenses. A 600% increase in daily LNG tanker rates, alongside rising container indices, is extending delivery times across sectors from automotive to white goods. This dynamic undermines the competitiveness of Turkish exporters dealing in high-volume, low-margin goods, while imbalances in container flows at ports trigger operational disruptions.
NO DEADLOCK ON ENERGY
In terms of energy security, Turkey has relatively limited direct dependence on the Gulf. On the oil front, suppliers such as Russia and Azerbaijan, along with the flow of 200–250 thousand barrels per day through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline as of March 18, minimize the risk of disruption.
In natural gas, uninterrupted supplies from Russia and Azerbaijan, daily production reaching 10 million cubic meters at the Sakarya field, and storage levels of around 4.5 bcm as of March 24 are all critical buffers. In addition, the 4 bcm U.S. LNG connection coming online in 2026 provides further flexibility, helping offset potential disruptions from Iran, which supplied 7 bcm to Turkey last year.
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR TURKEY
This challenging landscape also opens a window of opportunity.
Disruptions in supply chains centered in the Far East and the Gulf are reinforcing Europe’s shift toward near-shoring. While transit times from Asia can stretch up to 40 days, Turkey’s ability to access European markets within 3–7 days positions it as a regional production and distribution hub.
If supported by stronger raw material security and an accelerated transition to low-carbon production, this threshold could allow Turkey to secure a lasting and expanded share in European markets.
UNESCAPABLE INFLATIONARY PRESSURE
However, rising energy prices will place pressure on both the current account and the fiscal balance.
Every $10 increase in oil prices is estimated to add between $3–4.5 billion to Turkey’s current account deficit, including energy derivatives. Moreover, Brent crude surpassing the $100 threshold renders the $65 assumption in the 2026 budget obsolete, increasing the likelihood of a widening fiscal deficit.
In this sense, the Hormuz crisis represents a multi-layered cost shock for the Turkish economy — intensifying inflationary pressures while straining external balances. At this juncture, it is essential for Turkey to swiftly assess both the risks and opportunities created by the crisis and formulate an updated strategic roadmap.
*Mühdan Sağlam is the Director of the TEPAV Center for Energy and Climate Change Studies, specialized in the political economy of energy and climate change. A scholar with a PhD in International Relations, she has experience as a columnist and analyst at prominent Turkish and international media outlets.
Contact: muhdansaglam@gmail.com
