The dissolution and disarmament of the PKK, so far managed through security institutions, will be brought to Parliament’s agenda next week through a newly established commission. Although framed as “above politics” and “beyond party interests,” the “process” is creating new political maneuvering room for all parties. From the government to the opposition, political actors are repositioning themselves and recalculating strategies with an eye on the 2028 elections.
The AKP and MHP have made a sharp U-turn from their long-standing hardline, security-driven policies, and are now shaping their new agenda around the phrase “the foundation of Turkey’s century: a Terror-free Turkey.” They speak of a new alliance rooted in the fraternity of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs.
High level AKP sources speaking to Turkey in Depth believe that the process could help recover the party’s lost Kurdish vote, potentially securing victory in 2028. They also argue that a rapprochement with the DEM Party could pave the way for the long-sought “civilian constitution” and even enable an early election decision in Parliament, allowing Erdoğan to run again.
MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli has dismissed claims that the process is merely about re-electing Erdoğan, saying, “Our foremost goal is to rid our new century of the burden of terror. If terror is eradicated from our lives, isn’t it natural and right for our President Erdoğan to be elected once again?” This perspective feeds the narrative that, if successful, the process would cement Erdoğan’s image as the leader who ended terrorism.
DIFFICULTIES FACING CHP
The CHP finds itself in the toughest spot. With its presidential candidate imprisoned and its municipalities facing weekly government crackdowns, the CHP is striving both to keep its own base—angry over these events—onside and to avoid losing the crucial Kurdish votes needed to win a presidential election
While many CHP figures see the process as an attempt to prolong Erdoğan’s rule, they also acknowledge that their party, to be consistent with its historical stance on resolving the Kurdish issue, cannot remain on the sidelines. There is another concern for the CHP: alienating the nationalist voters it attracted in the last election. A CHP MP slated for the commission talked on the condition of anonymity: “We must reassure all sides. It’s a difficult process to manage. Walking away from the table would be easy. We choose the hard path.”
DEM HOPEFUL FOR FUTURE
The DEM Party, which has defined the solution of the Kurdish issue as its core policy, fully supports the process.
The PKK’s disarmament is expected to strengthen the party. With arms out of the picture, the DEM Party is expected to gain greater freedom to operate politically across Turkey and potentially move toward its true potential of 20% of the vote in the next elections.
SIGNS OF FAR-RIGHT CONSOLIDATION
The process has also opened a new political front for the ultranationalist parties.
The İYİ Party entered Parliament with 44 seats after winning 10% of the vote but has since fallen to 29 MPs and is polling at just 3-4%. The party has opted out of the commission in a bid to consolidate nationalist support.
The process is also bringing ultranationalist parties such as the İYİ Party, Zafer Party, and Anahtar Party closer together. Talks in Ankara point to a potential new nationalist front alliance, with claims that all three parties could gain momentum—either individually or collectively—through this alignment.
COMMISSION MAY EVEN MEET ÖCALAN
While it is impossible to predict how these electoral calculations will play out, politics will revolve around this process in the coming months. The first battleground will be the parliamentary commission.
All parties except İYİ have nominated members. The AKP and MHP view the commission’s role as overseeing the PKK’s disarmament, drafting necessary legal reforms, and developing proposals for the reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. They aim to complete preparations during the two-month recess, pass relevant laws by October or November, and consult civil society, legal experts, and academics along the way.
It is also claimed that the commission could meet with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, described by Bahçeli as the “founding leader of the PKK.” An AKP politician told Turkey in Depth that this was possible, adding: “Such a proposal could be brought to the commission. If necessary, Öcalan could be consulted as well.”
The commission will have no binding legal authority; recommendations will require a three-fifths majority before being turned into bills, signed by supporting parties, and sent to parliamentary committees and the floor for approval. According to AKP insiders, some parties might break away over the course of events but the plan is to continue with those remaining.
While the government insists the commission’s focus will be strictly on disarmament, opposition parties argue that the Kurdish issue is inherently tied to democratization, demanding broader reforms—from ending the appointment of state trustees to elected municipalities to lifting restrictions on free expression.
The process, said to have been started to resolve a problem that has cost Turkey half a century, and the newly established commission appear poised to spark serious debate. Reaching consensus among the parties will not be easy, but based on both sides’ assessments, the commission is expected to deliver three key benefits: first, it will bring transparency to the process; second, by allowing parties to present their demands and positions, it will help socialize their stances; and third, if the commission operates in a spirit of dialogue and compromise, it could help ease the long-strained political climate.
