By Nergis Demirkaya
The “new peace process” began with convention-shattering moves such as granting the “right to hope” to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and, after 15 months, is now not even back where it started. In fact, it has probably moved backward.
The government’s red lines have hardened, as it now conditions the continuation of the process on the integration of the SDF forces in Syria into the new Damascus government, while a security-first discourse has regained priority. So much so that, instead of “peace,” the possibility of a new cross-border operation has begun to be openly discussed.
That said, 2025 was a year in which significant steps were taken in the “new peace process.” Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK convened its congress, adopted a dissolution decision, held a disarmament ceremony, and withdrew its members beyond Turkey’s borders. A parliamentary commission was established in early August. As the year drew to a close, work also began on legislative proposals concerning the return and reintegration of organization members. However, the proposals submitted by the AKP and MHP to the commission signaled that the process will not move swiftly. Both reports made any legal steps conditional on state verification that the PKK has laid down arms, stating explicitly: “There should be no transition to a further stage without such verification and confirmation.”
SHIFT TO TERROR-FREE REGION
This condition might not have posed a problem for a PKK that had already withdrawn beyond the border, but the government expanded the scope to include the PKK’s affiliates — the YPG in Syria and PJAK in Iraq — declaring that “all branches and extensions of the organization must disarm.” As a result, the process shifted, as government officials have phrased it in recent months, from a “Terror-Free Turkey” to a “Terror-Free Region.” In other words, the integration of the SDF into the Damascus army has become the core condition. Yet what the government understands by “integration” is not the same as what the SDF understands.
ANKARA’S STANCE ON INTEGRATION
What they mean by integration was spelled out in simultaneous statements from Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik, issued alongside the presentation of the AKP report.
Güler stated that the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army could only be accepted on an individual basis, not as units. Çelik said they would not accept an integration plan that preserves divisions and units, declaring: “There cannot be two armies in one country; there cannot be two armed forces. That leads to civil war.” Foreign Minister Fidan, in his remarks, added: “We do not want to be forced to resort to military means again. The SDF must understand that the patience of the relevant actors is wearing thin and must fulfill its commitments under the March 10 Agreement.”
In a recent statement, the Defense Ministry argued that the SDF’s demands for decentralization and federalism undermine Syria’s territorial integrity and stability, adding: “If the Syrian government decides to take an initiative for unity and territorial integrity, Turkey will support it.” In other words, even if Turkey does not carry out an operation itself, it will fully back any operation undertaken by the Syrian government. This is one way to read the government’s latest Syria push.
EXTENSION OF COMMISSION’S MANDATE
For those advocating autonomy and proposing that the SDF be integrated into the Syrian army as a bloc — preserving its institutional military identity with “three divisions, one national guard brigade, and one brigade composed of women” — the Turkish approach clearly constitutes a major crisis. The crisis is not expected to be resolved in the short term. The extension of the mandate of the commission, which is tasked with proposing legal regulations, is also interpreted as a way to buy time with regard to developments in Syria.
A senior AKP official speaking to Turkey in Depth put it bluntly: “No step will be taken in Turkey before the SDF integration process in Syria is clarified. This is not about political will; it is entirely about public opinion. And public opinion is watching Syria. There is a step that needs to be taken to convince the public — and it will be taken in Iraq and Syria. Without seeing a picture in which all components of the PKK have laid down their arms and the expected Damascus integration has been achieved, there will be no move.”
These remarks suggest that the law that was planned to be adopted after the PKK’s dissolution decision will not be enacted before spring, even if developments proceed as the government intends. The joint report of the commission is expected to be completed in January, with technical work on the legal regulation in February. However, it is emphasized that the bill will not be passed into law without clarity on Syria.
If the process unfolds as the government envisions, Turkey will be discussing the return, integration, and rehabilitation of PKK members in the spring of 2026. According to AKP pundits, the release of former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş — for whom the European Court of Human Rights has issued a violation ruling — will be tied to the success of this process. It is also suggested that a comprehensive amendment to the law on prison sentencing could be addressed after this legislation. As for Öcalan’s “right to hope,” that is postponed to an indefinite future. Expectations such as citizenship reform, mother-tongue education, and strengthening local administrations — all requiring constitutional change to resolve the Kurdish issue — do not appear on the horizon in the near term.
