By Nergis Demirkaya
It has been seven months since MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli extended a hand to DEM Party members, and two months since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his organization to lay down arms.
The PKK, which announced it would comply with the call, made its first request for Öcalan to be allowed to communicate with the organization in order to hold a dissolution congress. However, no concrete progress has been made on this request, which requires government action. This has led some to ask if the process is stalling or whether there is a problem between the AKP and the MHP.
The word on the corridors of power in Ankara is that there is “no problem” for now—but there are notable differences between the AKP and MHP in terms of their expectations from the process. Meanwhile, DEM Party members have begun voicing doubts about the AKP’s sincerity.
One senior DEM official, speaking about the lack of action over the past seven months, said: “A group that has been fighting for 41 years and has influence across four countries from Iran to Syria wants to lay down arms, yet not a leaf is stirring on the government’s side. Neither is Öcalan allowed to communicate with his organization to dissolve it, nor is any humanitarian goodwill gesture—such as the release of ill prisoners—being taken. Anyone looking at this picture would conclude that the government does not truly want this process.”
The power center that the DEM official points to while expressing concerns about the process is not the MHP, which issued the call, but the head of the executive: AKP Chair and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although MHP officials appear to share a common stance on the process, they do not hide the fact that they are not fully aligned with the AKP.
It is no secret that the AKP and MHP have not been in full agreement on the process since day one. Nor is it hidden that Erdoğan has not embraced the process with the same enthusiasm and determination as Bahçeli. However, although Erdoğan is dragging his feet, he has not closed the door on the process.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AKP AND MHP
The different approaches to the process—led by Bahçeli and not yet explicitly rejected by the AKP—are explained in private parliamentary discussions as follows:
- The People’s Alliance formed by the AKP and MHP does not share the same view on every issue. The MHP has moved beyond its past positions on regional developments and is now analyzing Turkey’s future through a possible Turkish-Kurdish alliance. The stance adopted by the MHP—which has never received more than 18 percent of the vote—is not shaped by electoral concerns or a desire to govern, but rather by its influence on the political arena through its discourse on “the survival of the state.” The AKP, on the other hand, is more pragmatic and evaluates what political benefits the process might bring. From this perspective, Erdoğan’s calculations—his vote arithmetic—are seen as understandable. “Since the political cost will fall on the AKP, it’s normal for him to proceed cautiously,” it is said.
- Another view is that President Erdoğan, who has been in power for 23 years, is a “vote-winning machine.” He views this issue solely from the perspective of maintaining his rule. While the process might help regain conservative Kurdish voters who have drifted away from the AKP, it is clear that it will not bring any votes from DEM Party supporters. Recent polling is thought to have distanced Erdoğan even more from the process.
- According to MHP members, Bahçeli’s priority is the PKK’s self-dissolution, followed by additional steps. His endorsement of the radical “Right to Hope” proposal, which could potentially allow Öcalan to be released from prison, is seen as the clearest sign of this. If results are to be achieved, responsibility must be taken for bold steps like the Right to Hope. However, the AKP fears a repeat of the public backlash triggered by the 2009 Habur incident during a previous peace process, when a group of PKK members returned to Turkey and were met with celebrations.
- One notable opinion within the DEM Party is that Bahçeli’s MHP has a completely hierarchical structure in which the leader is not questioned. Erdoğan, by contrast, may be able to persuade his party, but as the head of the executive, he struggles to convince different power centers within the state. The delays and slow pace of the process may be due to this difficulty.
- Over the past decade, the government has won elections by criminalizing the opposition and linking them to the “terrorist organization PKK.” In opposition circles, some say that Erdoğan does not want to give up this very useful narrative. If the PKK were to lay down arms unconditionally, it is unclear what kind of reform process the AKP would undertake. Since the presidential system came into effect in 2018, the party’s capacity for reform and transformation is seen to have weakened.
- The AKP remains burdened by the weight of two previously failed peace bids. Party members argue that if a truly unconditional disarmament takes place, then the political climate would be suitable for discussing legal changes such as amendments to sentencing and other reforms. But they insist that no steps can be taken before weapons are surrendered.
NO TURNING BACK, SAYS DEM
In conclusion, the process—seen as a new threshold in solving the Kurdish issue—lacks a defined name or framework. Despite differing expectations between the AKP and MHP, Kurdish political actors remain hopeful. Even as the government drags its feet, Öcalan’s call to disarm is thought to be irreversible. According to DEM Party members who believe the Kurdish issue must be solved through democracy, the decision to lay down arms will be implemented whatever happens, easing and expanding the political space for opposition parties—especially DEM. Despite the government’s position, the democratic struggle after disarmament is expected to continue with greater confidence and strength.
This is the context in which DEM Party members say they are praying as much for Sırrı Süreyya Önder—an İmralı delegation member who has been fighting for his life for two weeks—as they are for Bahçeli, who has also faced health issues. The prayer for Önder is for him to witness the peace he has long worked for, while the prayer for Bahçeli stems from his perceived role as the guarantor of the process.
