By Cengiz K. Fırat
The post–Second World War international order is no longer being reformed. It is being deliberately and systematically dismantled. The assumption that today’s turbulence represents a temporary deviation from a rules-based system misses a more uncomfortable reality: the system itself is being hollowed out by its original architects.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the behavior of the United States.
Institutions that can no longer be controlled—or that constrain freedom of action—are abandoned, weakened, or bypassed altogether. Those that remain intact can do so only because they are seen as effective instruments of power projection. The message is blunt: multilateralism is acceptable only when it serves unilateral ends.
This marks an internal negation of the liberal order. The very actors who once wrote and enforced the rules now openly prefer rule-lessness. Norms, international law, and alliance ethics are giving way to a world governed by raw power, sovereignty, and deterrence. What we are witnessing is not the collapse of order from external pressure, but its erosion from within.
Recent U.S. actions illustrate this shift vividly. Strategic documents now emphasize sovereignty, economic security, and transactional engagement over alliance solidarity and institutional restraint. Politics is framed less as cooperation than as a zero-sum contest over resources, influence, and strategic domains. Legal frameworks matter only insofar as they do not obstruct decisive action.
The Western Hemisphere has become a testing ground for this approach. Venezuela, long treated as a sanctions case, has moved into a more openly coercive phase. The assertion of control over Venezuelan energy assets and the willingness to apply force reflect a strategy centered on resource dominance, not regime reform. At the same time, U.S. seizures of oil tankers in international waters—linked to Venezuela, Iran, or Russia—signal something even more consequential: a readiness to enforce economic outcomes through military means beyond traditional legal boundaries.
These are not routine sanctions operations. They are statements of intent. Control over energy flows, shipping lanes, and economic lifelines is increasingly treated as a legitimate arena of hard power.
RESHAPING THE WORLD
The Jan. 7 decision to withdraw from dozens of international organizations fits neatly into this pattern. Institutions that once amplified U.S. influence are now seen as liabilities—sources of friction rather than leverage. Supporters frame this as a restoration of sovereignty. Critics warn of declining global leadership. Both may be right. What matters more is the precedent: institutions exist only so long as they are useful to power.
This broader shift reshapes how other major actors behave. Russia is not adapting to the system; it has long operated outside it, using norm violation itself as a strategic tool. China, by contrast, has chosen a more patient and sophisticated route—remaining inside institutions while bending rules, hollowing out norms, and allowing time to work in its favor. This is not integration, but instrumentalized participation.
Europe, for now, still speaks the language of norms. But this owes less to conviction than to capability. As military and strategic capacity improves, Europe is likely to drift away from rule-based idealism toward interest-driven strategic autonomy. When that happens, even Europe may cease to function as the moral anchor of the old order.
RISKS AND CHANCES FOR TURKEY
This is the environment Turkey must navigate.
For countries in geopolitical fault zones, periods of systemic transition are inherently dangerous. The erosion of rules removes buffers that once protected middle powers from great-power rivalry. Energy markets become volatile, security dilemmas multiply, and institutional safeguards weaken.
Yet the same process also creates opportunity. As rigid blocs fracture and alliances become more transactional, the maneuvering space for middle powers expands. Influence becomes less about formal alignment and more about strategic relevance.
For Turkey, the central challenge is not choosing sides, but clearly defining interests. Military capability, energy security, logistics, and geography must be treated as strategic insurance—not ideological statements. Institutions should neither be defended out of moral reflex nor impulsively abandoned. Bridges matter, even when traffic slows.
The coming era will not reward loud declarations or rigid loyalties. It will reward states that can balance, hedge, and adapt without losing coherence. For Ankara, this means preserving strategic autonomy, diversifying partnerships, and strengthening economic and energy resilience against external coercion.
The world is entering a phase where power matters even when it abandons institutions—and institutions matter only when they serve power. Turkey cannot change this reality. But it can read it clearly, act calmly, and position itself not as a bystander to the dismantling of order, but as a state capable of navigating what comes after.
