Turkey’s parliament has entered a decisive phase in shaping the legal and political ground of the post-PKK period, as all five political party groups represented on a special parliamentary commission have now submitted their reports on the peace initiative. While there is broad agreement on ending armed conflict and moving toward a “Terror-free Turkey,” deep divisions remain over sequencing, legal scope, and the political meaning of the process itself.
The National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, established after the PKK’s announcement that it would dissolve and lay down arms, has moved into the drafting stage of a “policy document” intended to guide future legislative steps.
With the ruling AKP’s report formally presented to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Dec. 18 and expected to be submitted to parliament imminently, the commission is set to begin work on either a common framework text or a composite report reflecting unresolved differences.
Yet, as the commission moves toward drafting its final document — and as legislation looms on the horizon — the key question is whether parliament can transform overlapping objectives into a shared roadmap, or whether the process will once again stall at the fault line between security-first sequencing and demands for democratic and political normalization.
A NARROW COMMON GROUND
Across five party groups — the AKP, CHP, MHP, DEM Party and Yeni Yol — one point of convergence stands out: the armed conflict must end, and parliament should play a central role in managing the transition.
All parties acknowledge that the post-PKK phase requires legal and institutional handling, even if they disagree on its form. There is also a shared emphasis on restoring legal certainty, strengthening social cohesion, and securing public legitimacy for any next step.
Beyond that narrow overlap, however, the reports reveal sharply diverging political priorities — and firm red lines.
AKP: CONDITIONAL AND PHASED LEGISLATION
The AKP’s report, spanning 15 sections and more than 50 pages, adopts a cautious and conditional approach.
According to Sabah daily, any legislative step depends on what the AKP defines as “principled thresholds,” foremost among them official confirmation by state authorities that the PKK has fully disarmed.
Additional thresholds include compliance by armed structures in Syria in line with the March 10 agreement and assurances that no new formations will emerge across Turkey’s borders.
If these conditions are met, the AKP envisions a phased legal process beginning in the second half of January. Initial measures would focus on confidence-building steps for individuals not directly involved in violent acts, while those implicated in armed crimes would remain subject to existing penal law, with limited sentence reductions framed as not offending “public conscience.”
RED LINES: No legislation without verified disarmament; no deviation from a security-first sequencing.
MHP: RESTRUCTRUCTING EXISTING LAWS
The MHP, which submitted a 120-page report, calls for rewriting the existing laws on penal code and remorse law.
The MHP does not frame Constitutional Court or European Court of Human Rights rulings as politically binding obligations, but rather addresses them in a restrictive manner within the context of sentencing and execution regime debates.
For the MHP, disarmament is a non-negotiable precondition, and any reform must avoid undermining the unitary structure of the state or creating the perception of negotiation with an armed group.
RED LINES: Unitary state, rejection of political status claims, and zero tolerance for state-PKK bargaining.
DEM PARTY: PEACE LAW AND DEMOCRATIC INTEGRATION
The DEM Party frames the post-PKK period as a “Peace and Democratic Society Process” and argues that it must be grounded in a comprehensive Peace Law.
Its report calls for ending trustee-appointed municipalities, expanding language rights, fully implementing high-court rulings, and providing legal guarantees for the “right to hope,” including for Abdullah Öcalan.
DEM Party officials describe the current moment as a historic opportunity but warn that a security-centric or purely technical approach would fall short of delivering durable peace. The party’s İmralı delegation has stepped up its political outreach following meetings with the MHP and others, and is scheduled to meet the AKP on Dec. 20 and the CHP on Dec. 22.
RED LINES: No solution without political guarantees, constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, and Öcalan’s inclusion in the process.
CHP: DEMOCRATIZATION COMES FIRST
The CHP does not advocate a process-specific “peace law,” instead prioritizing a broad democratization agenda led by parliament, while waiting for the government to present a draft on legal requirements.
According to the CHP, any peace-oriented legislation in an environment of judicial erosion would lack credibility. For the party, normalization of the legal and political environment is a precondition — not a byproduct — of conflict resolution.
RED LINES: No new constitutional or peace framework without restored rule of law and an end to the trustee regime.
YENİ YOL: LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
The Yeni Yol Group positions itself between security-first and rights-first approaches, emphasizing the need for a clear legal framework anchored in parliament.
It proposes granting the President broad but “accountable” authority regarding the implementation of the process.
Yeni Yol officials warn against ad-hoc arrangements or executive-driven processes, arguing that parliamentary ownership and legal clarity are essential for legitimacy and sustainability.
RED LINE: No extra-parliamentary or personalized process without a binding legal framework.
WHERE BARGAINING IS POSSIBLE — AND RISKY
Despite entrenched red lines, several issues remain politically contested but potentially negotiable.
On trustee appointments, the AKP avoids taking a clear position on ending the practice, while the CHP and DEM Party openly call for its abolition. The MHP, meanwhile, neither proposes suspending the trustee regime nor frames it as a democratic problem, effectively treating it as a legitimate security instrument.
On sentencing and execution reform, the fault lines are conceptual rather than technical: the MHP approaches the issue through individual cases and security criteria; the DEM Party frames it as a political and rights-based demand; while the CHP and Yeni Yol treat it as a systemic problem of judicial governance requiring institutional reform.
On language and cultural rights, there is limited openness from the CHP and Yeni Yol, clear resistance from the MHP, and expansive demands from the DEM Party, making this another area where compromise is possible but politically fragile.
