By Barçın Yinanç
Turkish democracy is the casualty of Europe’s rediscovery of Turkey’s strategic value.
To better understand the context of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to Ankara next week, one has to go back to the end of the Cold War.
Whereas European countries have benefited from the peace dividend, the contrary happened for Turkey in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain. After enjoying the relative stability of the bipolar order of the Cold War era, Turkey found itself in the midst of several conflict zones. While most European countries downsized their defense budgets, Turkey had no such luxury. The fight against separatist terrorism, the turbulence created by the Gulf War, and regional conflicts like the ones in the Caucasus dictated the maintenance of a big and well-equipped army.
The direct or indirect embargoes, on the other hand, became the primary motivation for investing in the local defense industry.
Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and Trump’s second electoral victory, Europeans are waking up to the reality of their underinvested defense industry.
In that respect, currently it is not only Turkey’s large army but also its battlefield experience—and not only its weapons system but its growing production capacity—that have enhanced Turkey’s value as a geostrategic partner. Yet Turkey’s democracy might become the casualty of Europe’s rediscovery of Turkey’s strategic value.
TURKEY AS A SWING STATE
Turkey is often defined as a swing state, criticized by some for its shifting loyalties. Yet the West’s own approach to Turkey has been equally inconsistent, swinging from engagement to estrangement, from strategic partnership to punitive isolation.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has faced criticism for refusing to fully comply with Western sanctions against Russia and, in some cases, for allegedly helping Moscow circumvent them. At the same time, Erdoğan has drawn strong condemnation from Western governments for his open support of Hamas, which he views as a legitimate resistance movement rather than a terrorist organization — a position sharply at odds with that of the West.
Nowadays, you can hear European officials say, “After all, it is good that one among us has a dialogue with Turkey. It is good to have a back channel with Russia.”
Europe, it seems, wants to have its cake and eat it too. If President Erdoğan maintains a special line of communication with the Kremlin, it is precisely because Turkey does not fully comply with Western sanctions — a reality that European powers simultaneously condemn and quietly rely on. The same paradox applies to Hamas. European capitals, which have long criticized Ankara’s ties with the group, now find value in those very connections, as Turkey’s intelligence chief reportedly played a key role in pressuring Hamas to accept Donald Trump’s proposed peace deal. This inconsistency is perhaps most evident in the case of Germany, where the search for strategic partnership and political mistrust coexist uneasily.
CHANGING POLICY ON MILITARIZATION
Germany’s new chancellor decided to invest in its military at levels not seen since the Cold War. The country passed a major reform to its constitutional debt brake, unlocking billions of euros in funding.
“Germany is ending its strategic deep sleep period,” said a German expert who was in Ankara to attend a conference organized by the German Marshall Fund. “Merz will come to Ankara to eliminate barriers in front of defense cooperation,” the expert told the audience, adding that there is enormous potential for Turkish and German defense industry cooperation.
“It was a bad thing in the past to say that investing in the defense industry creates jobs and economic growth; now you can say it,” said the expert.
Germany joined the European countries to apply a veiled embargo on Turkey after its military incursions into Syria, and had been blocking the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon jets. Late last year, Berlin gave its green light and a preliminary agreement was signed last July for the delivery of 40 Eurofighter jets.
TIMING IS A BURDEN FOR TURKISH OPPOSITION
The change of heart predates the new German government, yet Merz is believed to be more decided on expanding cooperation with Turkey, especially in the defense field.
Yet this willingness comes at a time when the Turkish opposition passes through one of its darkest moments of its history.
Compared to the 1990s, when the jailing of Kurdish parliamentarians led to a serious crisis in Turkish-German relations, Berlin’s complacent attitude toward the oppression of the CHP — which won the recent local elections only to see its mayors imprisoned — represents a striking contrast.
Convinced that turning a cold shoulder to Ankara deprives Berlin of leverage over Turkey, the country’s democratic forces have called for at least a decade on European states — Germany included — to engage with Ankara, for instance through customs union modernization.
These calls, however, fell on deaf ears, and Germany’s renewed interest in reviving relations with Ankara could hardly have come at a worse time.
Still, Berlin can engage with Ankara while making it clear that democratic backsliding will prevent the two countries from realizing the full potential of their cooperation.
