By Barçın Yinanç
When Ukraine’s leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy landed in Ankara on Nov. 19, press reports had already started to make the headlines, revealing details of a peace plan drafted by the U.S. and Russia.
Officials from Turkey also had some input on the plan, according to Anadolu News Agency, suggesting Ankara was informed of the plan in contrast to European allies, who were caught by surprise. Even if Turkey was kept in the loop, the fact that Washington tried to strike a deal on Ukraine with Russia behind the back of European allies is likely to annoy Ankara.
If Donald Trump can sideline his European allies, he can do the same to Turkey, striking a deal with its adversaries. Of all people, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a shrewd politician himself, would know better than to trust in his warm relationship with Trump.
In addition, Turkey has experienced a lot of grievances in the past, dating back to the 1962 Cuban crisis, when the nuclear missiles in Turkey became a subject of negotiation on the ongoing crisis between Washington and Russia, without the former feeling the need to inform Ankara.
LACK OF TRUST
It is precisely the lack of trust in Trump that pushed Turkey to join the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine.
While Erdoğan is on the same page as Trump on seeking to end the war, a deal that will appear to reward Russia for its attack on Ukraine won’t serve Turkey’s national interests.
But Turkey was absent when the EU organized a meeting during the G20 summit in South Africa on Nov. 22 to voice concern at the U.S. plan. The meeting included non-EU members Canada, Norway and the U.K. but Turkey, represented by Erdoğan at the summit, was missing. Even Japan, which is a member of neither NATO nor the Coalition of the Willing, was present at the EU meeting. While Turkey did not join the statement published afterwards, European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen held a separate meeting with Erdoğan.
Was Turkey excluded? Or was it invited but refused to participate?
The first could be more likely, since Erdoğan, who spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the phone on Nov. 24, the following day joined an online session of the Coalition of the Willing for the first time. Previously Turkey had been represented by a vice president at the meetings of heads of states.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan did not endorse the Ukraine plan enthusiastically during his in-flight interview with journalists on his return from the G20 Summit.
A negotiated peace plan is possible only if it meets “the legitimate expectations and security needs of both sides” and does not lead to new instabilities, Erdoğan told reporters.
He emphasized that Turkey supports “a just peace where no side is left defeated,” arguing that sustainable peace must come from negotiations rather than one-sided demands.
NEED FOR TURKISH DEFENSE VS. ANKARA’S PRIORITIES
While European capitals appear not to trust President Erdoğan fully due to his close relations with Trump and Putin as well as his transactionalism, the country’s robust and experienced army as well as its defense industry, makes it indispensable especially in terms of post-ceasefire security guarantees in Ukraine.
Following the last meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, French President Emmanuel Macron said that, under the coalition plan, troops from France, the U.K. and Turkey could be sent to Ukraine — but only after a peace agreement is reached and not to the front lines.
Ironically, the Turkish public learned from the French president that Turkey could send troops to Ukraine, which is highly unlikely. Turkey would not like to jeopardize its relations with Moscow since Russia has made it clear it does not want to see NATO forces in Ukraine.
Some European diplomats, among them French, have been complaining about Turkey’s non-committal stance during the meetings of the Coalition of the Willing. Turkey is accused of playing its cards close to its chest. Macron might have intentionally mentioned Turkish troops to incite a public debate in Turkey. Yet, there was no official reaction from Ankara to Macron’s statement to the press.
Turkey is more likely to play a key role in the maritime component of a European-led reassurance force as explained by Alper Coşkun from Carnegie Endowment.
Meanwhile, the possibility of a deal that could favor Russia has drawn criticism from some experts in Turkey.
“It would be wrong to make an agreement that would legitimize the Russian occupation,” wrote retired ambassador Halil Akıncı on his social media account. Next would be Transnistria in Moldova, he added.
A deal that would reward Russia would have far-reaching consequences, according to Akıncı, who served as ambassador in Moscow.
“Europe should never recognize Russia’s occupation if an agreement is reached that leaves the occupied territories under Russian control,” Akıncı told me.
“If the United States had settled for a ceasefire instead of a permanent agreement, it would have stopped the fighting and secured peace, while also avoiding granting legitimacy to the Russian occupation,” he added.
