By Hasan Aygün

President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the helm in Washington DC will certainly affect the future orientation of NATO and have implications for American-Turkish security perceptions. The first term was occasionally stormy as President Trump publicly blamed NATO allies over a number of concerns and even threatened to pull out of the alliance. This time, he is coming back stronger than ever. The number one guiding factor of Trump's foreign policy is purely America's interests and he was not happy with the Europeans' reliance on American forces and money.

Whether Trump may pull the U.S. out of NATO during the second leg of his presidency is a widely discussed topic. One argument is that the U.S. is better off with a strong NATO that caters to American interests. The other argument is that the U.S. cannot afford to break up the alliance as, in such a scenario, allies likely would succumb to Beijing's and Moscow's dominance. U.S. failure in Afghanistan has already shown a major weakness in the western alliance's resolve to defend its values and the Trump administration might try to re-establish an image of a mighty force to reckon with.

During his first administration, Trump expressed serious doubts about Europe’s commitment to the alliance, mainly in terms of low budget allocations for defense. He suggested that the U.S. could pull out of the alliance unless all members increased their defense budgets to at least 2% of their GDP. The lack of common threat perceptions was another serious issue. According to Trump, Western Europeans shied away from his concept of potential adversaries, mainly the Russian Federation and China.

DEFENSE BUDGETS AND BURDEN SHARING

In fact, Moscow proved him right as the Russian military rolled across the Ukrainian borders, and now the Europeans are committed to taking a stand against Moscow and are spending more on defense. Only 23 of the 32 allies have reached the 2% goal, and others are following suit. Whether this change of heart will satisfy Trump’s expectations is not clear, but he will probably insist that the defense budget target be raised from 2 to 3% at the next NATO Summit in The Hague next June. (Turkey allocated enough resources to the defense budget and should have no concerns over the increased demands.)

Further to defence budget topics, Trump may take a step further and suggest a new format for the alliance, a more balanced burden-sharing, through a framework where membership benefits would run parallel to contributions.

UKRAINE: A TEST OF NATO’S RESOLVE 

Ukraine is an important game-changer for NATO as Trump sees allies’ capacity to provide for Ukraine’s defense as a litmus test of a new Transatlantic burden-sharing. He will try to end the war in Ukraine and push Russia to a mutually acceptable redrawing of borders between the two nations. If peace could be achieved, Trump would then push for Ukraine’s membership to NATO and draw the definite borders where the West meets/confronts Russia. 

In this scenario, the Trump Administration will squeeze NATO allies, including Turkey, to adhere strictly to embargoes on Russia. Ankara’s preference to sit on the fence may not be plausible by early 2025. On the Turkish side, the feeling of betrayal during Obama’s reign over American support to terrorist PKK-YPG causes in northern Syria had continued unabated during Trump’s first term, yet some interim deals led Turkey to hold on to a buffer zone in Syria. However, Trump had also advocated Kurdish nation-making in Northern Iraq, as a return to American investment in dismantling Saddam Hussein's regime.

TURKISH SECURITY UNDER SCRUTINY 

Trump sees an added financial benefit of bolstering European military capacities as nations will turn to U.S. defense contractors for weaponry. In such a scenario, self-reliance of NATO member countries could become an issue and among others, Turkish efforts to develop and export its own military industry products will be a topic of containment for the U.S. in the upcoming four years. 

It will not be a surprise if Trump takes a maximalist approach to President Erdoğan and demands Turkey get rid of its S-400 missiles. The threat of further sanctions on Ankara could likely be the course of action for quick persuasion.

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, will probably be an important adversary to Turkish interests as he might pursue inviting Cyprus to join NATO. In extremity, Rubio could push that Turkey be expelled from NATO on human rights/democracy topics, on Syria, Kurds, Hamas and anti-Israel policies.

How much Trump will listen to or use Rubio’s ambitions will be a test for Turkish security in the near future.