NATO’S TEST WITH THE SYRIAN SAGA
By Hasan Aygün
Throughout the Syrian drama, NATO never had a common vision or the resolve to push for a tangible solution to Syria’s descent into the abyss.
The Arab Spring confused NATO, as it failed to determine whether it was a threat to the alliance or not. In Libya, NATO got fully engaged, but the outcome was further disintegration of that country. In Syria, a much more complex country, NATO was just reluctant, due to polarized views of member nations. NATO’s prudent planning for intervention came up with a prohibitive cost, which no one wanted to assume.
Among NATO allies, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece chose to stand by Assad, and pursue economic relations with the Syrian regime. Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Italy were also calling for improved relations with the Damascus government.
Others chose to refrain from any active role. Turkey, the U.S. and the U.K. were the only allies directly supporting the rebels against the Assad regime. However, only after a few years, the latter two gave up the joint effort, failing to achieve concrete results.
OUTCOME OF NATO’S DISENGAGEMENT
The reluctance of NATO states to play a united role had sweeping consequences for both Syria and the region, allowing Iran and Russia into the theater as major stake-holders who not only extended the Assad regime’s life but also became instrumental in the ensuing stalemate. Syria fell into a brutal, destructive civil war, with 60% of the population becoming refugees or displaced persons.
While NATO became concerned by the refugee problem, mainly with the fear that radical Islamists could mix in the crowds and bring terrorism to Europe, it was the EU which found a partial solution: financing Turkey to host millions of Syrians and prevent them from entering the EU. With over 900,000 refugee babies born in Turkey, the refugees became a huge burden on Turkish society. Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria was disturbing, but not enough to energize any counter-action by the alliance.
In the absence of a Western presence, radical Islamists under the banner of the Islamic State or ISIL rose to prominence in 2014, hijacked the opposition leadership, and planted their roots in Syria. When the alliance failed to act, a coalition of like-minded countries united to fight ISIL. Over 10 years of efforts they weakened, but failed to eradicate the terrorists once and for all.
Back in Syria, Turkey continued to actively support the rebels, but the U.S. found an ally in the Kurdish minority of Syria as a sub-contractor to fight ISIL. The U.S.-armed Kurds established self-rule and expanded control over north-eastern Syria, but veered away from the opposition ranks and by a tacit agreement, did not fight Assad’s army. The U.S. deal with Kurds came at a huge cost to NATO’s integrity as those Kurds the U.S. called “partners” were mostly members of the PKK, an organization branded as terrorist by the same NATO, due to decades of atrocities they committed in Turkey.
The only tangible U.S. action against the Assad regime was the Caesar Act of 2019, that sanctioned the Syrian leadership for war crimes and also targeted Iranian and Russian entities for their governments' support to Assad.
The sanctions severely affected the Syrian economy and perhaps accelerate the collapse of Assad.
EFFECTS OF NATO’S INACTION IN THE REGION
The disengagement of the alliance with Syria weakened the strategic ties with regional players. The Arab League re-invited Assad to join official events and regional allies such as Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar gravitated away from NATO as an ally to reckon with.
On the political front, the alliance lost influence within the international peace process. Peace talks shifted from Geneva to Astana, with Iran, Turkey, and Russia negotiating ceasefires and freezing the crisis for eight years.
WHAT IS NEXT IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPPOSITION VICTORY
Whether or not allies or others were involved in the toppling of the Assad regime, NATO has to define a new course of action given the present realities on the ground.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the leading faction in Idlib, is on the Terrorist List of the U.S. and few other allies, and NATO nations are divided in their approach to this reality. The current U.S. administration will keep U.S. troops in Syria and keep HTS on the Terrorist List, whereas incoming President Trump promises to stay out of the Syrian quagmire. Major NATO nations such as France and Germany prefer to give the new rulers of Damascus a chance to build stability. Kurdish nation-building efforts will continue to be a major thorn among allies and Turkish guarantees of Syrian territorial integrity will be a direct challenge to U.S. intentions to that effect.
Securing the interests of NATO and the safety of its regional partners requires decisive collective action. Whether the alliance will up its act in Syria remains as a big question mark for now.
