By Barçın Yinanç
Every time Turkey takes a big step backward and away from democratic rule, those familiar with Turkish-EU relations tend to also blame the Merkel-Sarkozy duo, who reined back Turkey’s accession talks in the mid-2000s at a time when the AKP was undertaking sweeping reforms to reach universal standards.
It was the most serious and bitter wake-up call for those who still had faith in European values, that no matter what Turkey would do, it would never be considered a member of the European family, despite its NATO and Council of Europe membership.
In the 2000s Turkey was considered to be “too Muslim, too big, too poor.” By the 2020s, Turkey came to be seen as an emerging power but is still considered “too Muslim and too big.” But it is also seen to be potentially too influential and assertive, an attribute disliked by big powers. A democratic Turkey would fully reach its potential, making it a power difficult to tame.
Turkey’s deepening democratic deficit is, first and foremost, the responsibility of its citizens. Yet, looking at past patterns is important to understand the future of Turkey’s relations with Europe.
Once the European political elites decided that the EU’s transformative power would not be used to mobilize democratization in Turkey, the democratic deficit suited both sides.
While Turkey’s relations with some member countries deteriorated, its relationship with the EU stagnated, lacking strategic depth.
The migration crisis of 2015-16 opened a window of opportunity to revitalize relations.
The migration agreement of March 2016 between Turkey and the EU is often seen as a “dirty deal.” Had it been properly implemented, it could have served to give a new dynamism to relations. Yet, following the coup attempt of 2016, the relationship turned into a transactional one, again suiting both sides perfectly.
UKRAINE WAR AND TRUMP: A NEW OPPORTUNITY?
Russia’s war on Ukraine and Trump’s election as president appear to have opened a new window of opportunity for the relationship.
“Turkey, once an ‘awkward’ partner, has become essential for a weakened EU,” was the headline of Nicolas Bourcier’s article in Le Monde.
Europe used to see a huge refugee camp in Turkey, and now it sees a big army and an efficient defense industry, which comes in handy given recent developments.
Europe sees a country ready to put boots on the ground in Ukraine.
As European capitals rediscovered Turkey as the need arose, Ankara is readying for a “negotiation.”
“Europe’s security without Türkiye is unimaginable,” says Ankara, as if imagining Turkey’s security without Europe against a nuclear power like Russia is imaginable.
If Ankara thinks, “Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe,” then this will be a wrong calculation, according to a European diplomat talking at a close-door meeting hours after Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was taken into detention.
“If we do something, we will absolutely ask something for it. That goes without saying,” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told the press, referring to the negotiation process ahead.
Fidan and high-level military officials have been participating in talks of the coalition of the willing discussing the ways of providing security guarantees to Ukraine. Ankara is signaling to be willing to deploy non-combatant forces in Ukraine.
WHAT WILL IT GET IN RETURN?
Many experts thought Europe’s increased interest in Turkey as a strategic asset against Russia would help revive relations with the EU on an institutional basis. Starting negotiations to update the customs union, visa liberalization, high-level dialogue on key issues were on the list to put the relationship back on track. Yet, these hopes were shattered following the detention of Mayor İmamoğlu.
“It is a new day. A lot has changed today,” said a European diplomat. “Turkey is falling into the Trump trap; thinking problems can be solved at the leadership level. Developments in Turkey will have repercussions,” added the diplomat.
Yet, reactions from Europe to İmamoğlu’s detention remained rather weak. As Turkey further distances itself from the rule of law by increasing pressure on the opposition, this will again suit the interest of Europeans, justifying them to maintain transactionalism.
No doubt there will be excruciating negotiations between Ankara and its European partners. But at the end of the day, Turkey will agree to send troops provided Europe turns a blind eye to Turkey’s transition from “competitive autocracy,” where some breathing room to the opposition is allowed, to full-fledged autocracy.
Yet, Europe does have leverage over Turkey. The country risks being left out in the cold if it is excluded from European security architecture. But, likely, Europe will not use that leverage, preferring to have a limited engagement with Turkey.
