By Barçın Yinanç
Nearly a decade after the migration deal that was signed between the EU and Turkey under the leadership of Germany, the arrangement that succeeded in stopping migrants entering Europe via Turkey remains the backbone of the transactional relationship between Ankara and Berlin. However, although Turkey continues to be seen as a buffer zone stopping the migration flows, there is also a renewed discovery among European capitals of the country’s value as a strategic asset.
The need to contain Russia, coupled with the U.S. president’s ambivalent stance on collective defense, is prompting European capitals to rethink the continent’s defense architecture. Turkey, with NATO’s second-largest army, its defense procurements, and a rapidly growing defense industry, has attracted the attention of several European powers. Countries such as Spain and Italy have long been deepening their defense cooperation with Turkey.
However, the recent visits to Ankara by the British and German prime ministers do not indicate that a more strategic deepening of defense cooperation with these countries is imminent.
NO LOVE AFFAIR BETWEEN ERDOĞAN AND EUROPEAN LEADERS
The visit by Keir Starmer on Oct. 27, was followed by Friedrich Merz, on Oct. 30.
It was their first official visits since their elections. Both came to Ankara and kept their visit very short, leaving barely time for a proper lunch, which shows there is no love affair between them and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with whom they have already met on the margins of international gatherings.
Starmer came the day after Istanbul’s jailed mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu testified to prosecutions building a case that he was involved in spying for the British. As the leader of Labour, Starmer maintained radio silence for months about the pressure its ideological sister, the CHP, has been under.
Starmer started his visit at the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) where he posted a video announcing a deal worth 8 billion pounds for the sale of 20 Eurofighter jets. The recurring theme in his message and the spin given to the British press was securing 20,000 jobs.
“Look at all the fuss being made over just 20 jets. As if these 20 Eurofighters are going to save the entire U.K. economy. If 20 Eurofighters bring this much economic benefit to the U.K., they must be operating with quite a huge profit margin. So if we ordered 100 Eurofighters, they’d probably throw in Hyde Park as a gift,” tweeted opposition MP Namık Tan.
Apart from the signing, no concrete information was shared with the press in terms of future cooperation in defense and economic fields.
Neither Starmer nor Merz were accompanied by business delegations. While trade is on the rise with Germany, direct investment figures are low and the statement at the end of the visit did not leave room for optimism, a sign that German businesses lack the appetite to invest in Turkey due to economic and political conditions.
GERMAN APPROVAL A FAVOR TO TURKEY OR TO THE U.K.?
Merz is said to have refused an offer to visit TUŞAS, but his official program was equally short.
While Ankara welcomes Berlin’s decision to approve the sale of Eurofighters, given Germany’s role in the consortium, one may wonder whether Berlin intended to favor the U.K. rather than Turkey.
This marks the first new order of U.K. Eurofighter Typhoons since 2017. After 15 months in office, Starmer has become the most unpopular British prime minister on record. Recent polls indicate that Reform U.K. leader Nigel Farage holds a slight lead over Starmer when Britons are asked about their preferred choice for prime minister.
If Berlin’s approval of Eurofighter jets was intended more as a favor to the British than to the Turks, this could explain why Erdoğan and Merz paid lip service to defense cooperation without mentioning any concrete projects.
Merz’s statement that the two countries “will cooperate more closely in the field of security policies” represents a willingness for more dialogue and coordination on issues like Russia or challenges in the Middle East.
“Germany will not put enough pressure on countries like Greece and Greek Cyprus in order to include Turkey in the EU’s defense mechanisms. But Germany aims to keep Turkey as a strategic reserve against Russia, anticipating that Turkey’s role may become increasingly important in the future,” said a Turkish official.
MERZ WANTS TO SEE TURKEY IN THE EU
Merz’s visit is also motivated by the domestic agenda. Like Starmer, Merz is also under pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and migration issues continue to rank number one on the agenda. The 2016 deal with Turkey, therefore, still remains critical for Germany.
“The man in trouble takes advantage of another man in trouble,” said a former diplomat, talking about the visits of the two European leaders.
Merz appeared to endorse a bolder yet engaging attitude with Erdoğan. In contrast to Starmer, Merz and Erdoğan allowed the press to ask questions which also involved one about İmamoğlu. As expected, Erdoğan brushed it off, accusing the mayor of corruption.
Merz, a Christian Democrat, went out of his way to say, “I and the federal government want to see Turkey in the European Union.” German Christian Democrats have been traditionally against Turkey’s EU membership.
Maybe he uttered those words, knowing how far Turkey under its current regime is from membership. He then continued, “The decisions made in Turkey do not meet the Copenhagen criteria. In terms of the rule of law and democracy, they do not align with what is understood in Europe. I expressed my concerns. For example, I mentioned that there are issues regarding judicial independence that are not compatible with our understanding.”
After openly addressing the problems in terms of the EU accession, Merz said something that even opponents of the current regime have been calling for for years: “I expressed to the president that I wish to establish a strategic dialogue on this matter at the European level.”
Whether this strategic dialogue will take place remains to be seen. Even if it were to begin, as long as the current regime continues its oppressive approach, it is unlikely to yield tangible results. Yet, as Erdoğan’s opponents have long argued in their conversations with European interlocutors, engaging Ankara opens the door to a discussion on the democratic deficit — and it is still preferable to adopting a “three-monkey strategy.”
