By Barçın Yinanç
The Trump administration has handed NATO allies a list of questions within the framework of an ongoing six-month Pentagon review of American forces in Europe.
Some of the questions have been perceived as a test of loyalty to Trump’s foreign policy vision.
Here is what Ankara’s answers might look like to the main four sets of questions:
NATO 3.0
-Is the country increasing defense spending and moving to fulfill NATO's new spending commitments?
-What the country contributes to NATO's command structure and forces.
It will be easy to answer these.
Turkey is among the top three Allies contributing most extensively to NATO missions and operations. The answer will list these contributions, such as in the Balkans, where Turkey will continue to command KFOR until October of this year, while starting last month Turkey deployed four F16 aircraft to Estonia in support of NATO Policing Missions.
US WEAPONS - MADE IN EUROPE
-Does the country purchase US-made military equipment?
-Has the government opposed policies favoring “Made in Europe” defense procurement?
-Would it be willing to change its position regarding European-preference rules?
Ankara’s answer will certainly mention complications in its plans to purchase F-16s as well as F-35s.
Answering the question on “Made in Europe” would be trickier.
The genuine answer would be something like the following: “Since we can’t finalise a deal on F-16s and F-35s we had to purchase Eurofighters. Currently, we also face the risk of being excluded from the Made in Europe and Europe-based initiatives. If Made in Europe includes Turkey, we’d be happy selling and buying from Europe. If the tendency to exclude Turkey continues, we would oppose it. Having suffered from arms embargoes from both the US and Europe, our preference would be not to rely on either. But since we are years away from building our own fighter jets, we have to buy from both, no matter how costly.”
Washington will not get such a straightforward answer. A more diplomatic response will certainly present Ankara’s stated position of seeing US and European defense industries complement each other for the sake of Trans-Atlantic security.
MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE US
-Has the country restricted US access to its military bases or restricted US military flights/overflight rights?
-Specifically, has it restricted US access in connection with American military operations involving Iran? And crucially: Is it willing to reduce or eliminate any such restrictions.
Yet another set of complicated questions. As relations deteriorated between Ankara and Washington starting from the beginning of the 2010s, Turkey did make life difficult for the US in terms of access to military bases, and in terms of military flights and overflight rights.
It took nine months of negotiations for Turkey to reach an agreement with the US to open its bases for strike missions against ISIS.
In parallel to the deteriorating military cooperation, Washington opted to expand its presence in Jordan, Greece and Greek Cyprus.
The answer to this question certainly requires diplomatic language skills as far as Turkey is concerned.
As to the question on Iran, Turkey might be able to save face by recalling the presence of the Kürecik radar near the Iran border.
US FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
-Has the country been publicly supportive of US foreign-policy priorities?
-Does the country support key US initiatives, including American priorities in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere?
No doubt the answer will recall how President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been publicly supportive of Trump’s foreign policy priorities, starting with his aim to end the Russia-Ukraine war. Turkey joined the Board of Peace initiative and became one of the signatories to the process that led to a ceasefire in Gaza, which actually did not stop Israel from continuing to kill civilians in the region. Having said that, no country is happier than Turkey with the policy Trump has endorsed in Syria.
I am sure the answer will not mention the fact that Turkey would not and could not possibly support Trump’s rhetoric on invading Greenland.
At the end of the day, in view of Trump’s good relations with Erdoğan, Turkey stands to pass the loyalty test. The review would probably not change much in the US military presence in Turkey including keeping nuclear bombs in İncirlik.
Perhaps the review’s effect on the US presence in Greece might carry more importance for Ankara.
