By Barçın Yinanç
The NATO summit in Ankara provided an important opportunity for Turkey to showcase the progress of its defense industry. By now, few can have missed the fact that Turkey has become the world's 11th-largest arms exporter.
Thanks in particular to its advances in drone manufacturing, Turkey has made a dramatic leap in defense exports. According to international reports, Turkish arms exports grew by 103 percent between 2020 and 2024.
The strong battlefield performance of Turkish-made drones in conflicts such as those in Libya and Ethiopia in 2020-2021, where they helped alter the course of the fighting, as well as in Syria and Azerbaijan, significantly boosted interest in the defense industry.
IS THERE A DRONE DIPLOMACY?
The term 'Turkey's drone diplomacy' has since become a common expression among foreign analysts.
It is, however, questionable whether Turkey has any drone diplomacy at all. Rather, its approach appears to be one of selling weapons to anyone willing to buy them.
A defense expert told me he failed to identify a clear correlation between Turkey’s drone exports and its diplomacy.
Take Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance. The two countries support opposing sides in Sudan’s civil war. Yet the UAE was Turkey’s largest customer for arms exports between 2020 and 2024. Open-source reports also indicate that Turkey has sold armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the UAE.
Recently, reports emerged that a Turkish-made drone operated by the Sudanese Armed Forces had shot down another Turkish-made drone being used by the opposing faction.
Last year, there were also reports that, in response to Bayraktar drones operated by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the opposing side had approached another Turkish defense company in an attempt to purchase drones.
Turkey is among the actors — alongside China, Russia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE — frequently identified as participants in the proxy wars that have fueled the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan. Severe human rights violations are taking place. At the same time, there have been reports that Turkey wants to act as a mediator in the civil war.
Doesn’t offering mediation while also being accused of selling weapons create a contradiction? How compatible is Turkey’s involvement in the cycle of proxy wars in Africa with the broader principles of its foreign policy, particularly its Africa strategy?
SOFT POWER OUT, HARD POWER IN
Turkey has won the “hearts and minds” of many in Africa in a very short period of time by using its “soft power.”
The AKP government’s “win-win” approach was successfully implemented from the mid-2000s onward because Turkey’s economy was stronger at the time and Africa, by and large, was governed by relatively more stable administrations.
However, Turkey is now unable to back its soft power with financial resources. Moreover, over the past decade, Africa has entered a cycle of instability in which governments have been overthrown through coups, terrorist organizations have gained strength, and civil wars have reached devastating levels.
In such an environment, Turkey, unable to support its soft power with financial clout, has instead found itself with a major market opportunity in a war economy.
TURKEY’S LEARNING CURVE
Very few people in Turkish society would argue that Turkey should not sell weapons or become involved in dirty wars. However, shouldn’t the country take a more cautious and controlled approach when it comes to exporting weapons systems?
Until relatively recently, Turkey’s legislation was primarily designed around imports, while regulations governing exports are comparatively new, according to a representative of the industry.
Other experts, however, argue that the Turkish government has a well-established interagency process, coordinated by the Foreign and Defense Ministries. They contend, however, that the system does not function effectively due to political interference and attempts to bypass existing regulations.
Greater control over arms exports is also important to prevent damage to the defense industry itself. Some Turkish companies do not merely sell weapons systems; they also transfer technology. In such cases, the recipient country's defense industry may eventually emerge as a competitor.
Moreover, technology transfer requires a comprehensive offset agreement. Experts have doubts about whether technology transfers are being carried out according to this principle.
The practice of an end-user certificate is also of critical importance. For years, Turkey criticized its allies for their weapons falling into the hands of the PKK. It cannot dodge responsibility if Turkish-made weapons are found in the hands of non-state actors.
In the end, the issue boils down to Turkey’s need for financing.
Turkey lacks funding to sustain and expand its defense industry projects. That, in turn, creates pressure to accelerate arms exports.
As a result, there is reluctance to take some of the steps necessary to become a more responsible arms exporter.
