By Hakan Okçal
Turkey’s overzealous Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became prime minister in 2014 only to be sacked by Erdoğan a short while later, once bragged that not even a leaf could move in the Middle East without asking Turkey.
It was a time when Ankara was extremely confident about its influence in the region, especially in Syria. However, the Assad regime proved to be much more resilient than thought, thanks to Russia’s support. During this period, Turkey’s influence in Syrian affairs was doubted and even ridiculed by critics of the Ankara government. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan actually tried in vain several times to start direct talks with Bashar Assad through Russian channels.
Everybody was surprised when the Assad forces virtually melted away in front of the small but well-disciplined HTS (Hayat Tahrir al Sham) forces led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani, or Ahmed al-Sharaa by his real name. The Ba’athist regime in Damascus unexpectedly crumbled in a span of two weeks. The collapse was a surprise for everybody, Turkey included.
According to the Astana process with Russia and Iran, Turkey was supposed to disarm all Islamic terror groups based in the Idlib province of Syria, where the HTS was the de facto ruling power. HTS was and still is a listed terror organization in the West as well as in Turkey. Although never revealed officially, Turkey must have had a role in, or at least knowledge of, HTS’s preparations against Damascus.
So, was Davutoğlu’s emphatic assertion about Turkey’s might in the region really vindicated? If there was a slight truth in such a perception, it was soon to be dissipated as the ground in Syria started shifting against Turkey’s interests. Ankara’s prime goal in Syria has always been the annihilation of the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG Kurdish organization which has been ruling the northeastern part of Syria through the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) coalition that it patched together with local Arab tribes under US support and supervision. The U.S. and the West have never viewed the PYD/YPG group as a terrorist organization, contrary to Turkey’s repeated demands. In fact, the PYD/YPG is treated as a trusted ally by the U.S. in its fight against ISIS terrorism.
Had Turkey managed to solve its own Kurdish problem, there would have been no reason to tackle the Syrian Kurds. But this opportunity was squandered in 2015 when the peace process with the PKK was ended by Ankara in a bloody reprisal that left scores of deaths in the southeast. Before that, the PYD was a legitimate interlocutor for the Erdoğan government, and its leader Salih Muslim was hosted many times in Turkey for official talks.
It was America’s intervention that prevented Turkey from starting a military mopping-up operation over its southern border with Syria against the PYD/YPG group in the early days of the power change in Damascus. In the absence of Turkish intervention, the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA), a patchwork of extremist Islamic militant groups trained and financed by Turkey, moved against the PYD/YPD over the Euphrates River only to be driven back. So far, the YPG seems to be holding its ground against assaults from the SNA, which in due course decided to disband itself and join the central Syrian army that is being formed under Al Sharaa’s leadership. Under such circumstances, Turkey has passed the difficult job of doing away with the PYD/YPG to al Sharaa’s central government.
The PYD/YPG, in a very clever maneuver, has recently also agreed to join the central Syrian army and agreed to expel all non-Syrian fighters from its military line-up. Such a move inevitably takes away any reasonable justification for an HTS military operation against the YPG. In fact, al-Sharaa seems to be reluctant to get his forces bogged down in such a fight. If a central army can ever be built in Syria, this will require the consent of all political factions and ethnic groups on a constitutional settlement. Until then, the YPG will maintain its presence in the northeast of Syria, leaving Turkey without any option but to accept the reality on the ground.
A CENTRALIZED UNITARY STATE IS HARD TO COME BY IN SYRIA
Al-Sharaa’s ambition to create a unitary state with centralized powers is proving hard to achieve as the days pass. Like the Kurds, the Druze community in the south has refused to lay their weapons down. They actually barred the HTS governor and his security forces from entering their region in the early days of the Syrian power change. In their latest move, they established their own autonomous rule pending a federal state, although al-Sharaa is vehemently opposed to such an idea. Since the Druze, like the Kurds, have strong external allies backing them, it will be extremely difficult for al-Sharaa to impose his will on these unruly but brave people. Israel has warned Damascus not to resort to military violence against the Druze.
Furthermore, the Alawite community seems to be taking up arms against militant Islamic groups who have close ties with the HTS to defend itself from so-called retribution attacks. Christians and other vulnerable minority groups are suffering similar predicaments. Under these circumstances it is highly doubtful if a centralised state apparatus can be formed at all. It would be a huge frustration for Turkey if eventually a decentralized state in one way or another emerges at the end of the day in Syria. That said, all developments indicate that such an eventuality would be to the benefit of Syria if further bloodshed is to be avoided.
The new Damascus government’s decision to impose high import taxes on Turkish goods and an entry visa obligation for Turkish travelers for a sizeable fee were also disappointing for Ankara. It is yet to be seen if Turkish companies will get the lion’s share from the expected reconstruction contracts in Syria. Turkey is also expecting to assume a leading role in the reorganization of the new Syrian army that will bring along lucrative contracts. Turkey’s chances of securing such prizes seem to be hanging in the balance for the moment. There is a fair chance that Turkey could be left out in the cold since it will not be the political benefactor behind such tasks. So, one might conclude that things are not quite moving in the direction of Davutoğlu’s assertions in Syria.
TURKEY DOES NOT HAVE INFLUENCE IN GAZA EITHER
Davutoğlu’s prophecy did not work for the Palestinians either. To this day, Turkey’s input has been secondary to that of Egypt and Qatar and seems to be limited to its ties with the Hamas group in receiving some hardcore militants in the prisoner swap. Although it was always more vocal than any other country in deploring Israel, Turkey has also failed to assume a leading role in stopping Israel’s genocidal attacks in Gaza.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that Erdoğan remains quite mute when it comes to opposing Donald Trump’s unbelievable project of turning the Gaza Strip into a second Riviera on the Mediterranean.
Should there be a counter initiative against Trump’s Gaza plan, which seems highly unlikely, this responsibility will be shouldered by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, not Turkey.
