By Barçın Yinanç
The war on Iran has once again revealed the confusing complexities of Turkey’s geostrategic positioning as a middle power between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
NATO air defense systems have shot down three ballistic missiles fired from Iran targeting Turkey, fueling debate among certain groups about Turkey’s membership in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. For NATO and Western sceptics, had Turkey not hosted the radar in Kürecik Malatya, or let İncirlik be used as an Alliance asset, it would not have been the target of Iranian missiles. In fact, some even doubted whether it was really Iran who fired these missiles, speculating that “Western forces” would want to provoke Turkey to enter the war against the regime in Tehran.
However, Turkey has a complex relationship with the neighboring Islamic regime. While it is a cliché that the two countries have not fought a conventional war since 1639, they have been regional rivals, often pursuing different interests, as was the case during the civil war in Syria.
The absence of NATO assets would have left Turkey vulnerable to Iran’s development of missile technology.
According to defense expert Sıtkı Egeli, it is financially difficult for Turkey in the short and medium term to develop by itself a multilayered missile defense system capable of interception in space. “In a geography where the threat of ballistic missiles is so intense, it would not be rational to remain outside the umbrella of NATO. The defense umbrella provided by NATO is an important element of defense and security for Turkey,” Egeli from Izmir Economy University told DW Turkish.
The decision by the U.S. to send two Patriot systems, in addition to the Spanish Patriot system employed for more than a decade, must have come as a relief to Turkish decision-makers who often display distrust towards the U.S. and NATO.
Yet, just as is the case for its European allies, Turkey’s ruling elites are aware they can not fully trust Washington and as a result, experts are warning Ankara should carefully monitor France’s initiatives on nuclear deterrence.
“At a time when NATO’s European allies are inclined to strengthen their nuclear capacity and capabilities for Europe in order to reinforce their defenses, it would not be a correct or appropriate approach for Ankara to leave this new area unaddressed and thus push itself into a spectator role,” wrote Fatih Ceylan, Turkey’s former envoy to NATO.
NEW DYNAMICS IN ANKARA’S RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON
The war in Iran has also revealed changes in Ankara’s relations with Washington.
There is no doubt that not a single member of the top brass believes the war was started justly by the U.S. and Israel. Yet, starting with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish leadership has adopted relatively moderate rhetoric toward the Trump administration.
Even Spain’s prime minister was more critical. But, Ankara does not want to disrupt the positive chemistry as well as the effective dialogue with Washington.
While a compromise to solve the Halkbank case was revealed a few days after the start of the war, Washington appears to have taken seriously Ankara’s warning not to provoke Iranian Kurds.
In addition, the desire to play a mediation role also explains Turkey’s moderate rhetoric about the U.S. as well as Iran.
DOES TURKEY NEED TO POSITION ITSELF AT THE CENTER OF THE CIRCLE OF FIRE?
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who has long promoted the idea of “regional ownership” for the Middle East, must have noticed that it’s proving very hard for Ankara to find itself on the same page as Gulf-Arab countries.
Fidan attended a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Riyadh and had to sign a statement which only blamed Iran for the current armed conflict, avoiding any mention of the U.S.
“As the Gulf Arabs move full speed toward becoming involved in the war, the tone of the statement signed in Riyadh — also endorsed by Turkey — is of a nature that could undermine Ankara’s claim of neutrality in the war in Iran. This situation could strain Turkey’s relations with Tehran as well as its capacity to act as a mediator,” wrote journalist Zeynep Gürcanlı.
While Ankara is stepping up efforts to try to find a middle ground between Tehran and Washington to stop the war, it tries in parallel to prevent Gulf Arab countries from joining the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
This divergence should act as an eye-opener for Ankara as it pushes for deepened security cooperation with some countries of the region.
“Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan meet as Ankara pushes for a security pact”
was the headline of Middle East Eye’s report dated March 21.
This report was then followed by another in the same outlet the next day, arguing that “despite accelerated cooperation as a result of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, structural and political constraints would make a formal military alliance unlikely.”
This is the time Turkey should promote itself as a European power neighboring the Middle East that enjoys NATO’s protection, keeping it outside of the war zone. Yet, Fidan has not missed any occasion to say that “the Middle East” is “our region,” and that Turkey should pursue regional ownership to enable regional countries to find solutions to regional problems.
From Saudi Arabia, to Egypt and even Pakistan most of the Arab Gulf countries are still very dependent on the U.S. and Turkey will find it hard to make them meet on the same page. In addition, Fidan’s efforts to deepen regional defense cooperation with these countries could work against Turkey’s interests as the country might find itself entangled in regional rivalries.
