By Barçın Yinanç
The leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan reiterated the good relations between the two countries in front of the cameras on March 5 in Ankara, while opening a new pipeline connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Yet, while the two do indeed enjoy good relations, they do not see eye-to-eye in their visions for regional peace in the Caucasus.
The prospect of a peace deal in Ukraine under terms favorable to Russia can be a cause of concern for some in Ankara, as a more assertive Moscow could now turn its attention towards the Caucasus. Baku, however, appears not to be concerned about a “Russian comeback,” convinced that it can manage its relations with Moscow.
Turkey believes striking a peace deal in the Caucasus before a ceasefire in Ukraine would be to the advantage of the regional countries. Baku is in no such hurry and sees no problem in holding Ankara’s policy towards Yerevan hostage.
HOSTAGE DIPLOMACY
Over more than a decade, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have grown to resemble those between the U.S. and Israel, in which the smaller country holds the bigger country’s foreign policy hostage.
The vested interests of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, leave Ankara no room for maneuvering in its relations with Armenia.
Despite the end of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and talks continuing between Baku and Yerevan for a final peace deal, Ankara is not “allowed” by Baku to start talking to Yerevan to normalize relations.
While Turkey had initially promised parallel talks, Baku wants Ankara to start normalization with Yerevan only after it signs a final deal with Armenia.
Yet, international observers and even some Turkish experts criticize Baku for being maximalist and accuse Aliyev of moving the goalposts.
The conviction in Baku is, “We won; the Armenian economy is crumbling; its army is weak; we have the advantage; let’s keep it that way,” according to an expert familiar with the issue. This conviction does not appear to be based on a strategy and “keeping this advantageous position forever is not realistic” said the expert.
RESISTANCE FROM AZERBAIJAN
Baku resists Ankara’s preferred strategy of turning a new page to push those “advantages” forward.
Ankara has been encouraging the Azerbaijani leader to seal a deal without further delay, to which Aliyev has been turning a deaf ear.
For many in Ankara, Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan is a chance to strike a deal, as he has been extremely courageous in challenging some of the longstanding Armenian arguments based on hostility against Turkey and Azerbaijan.
More recently he came under severe criticism for his comments about Armenians’ claim of genocide.
DOUBLING CRITICISM
But the more Pashinyan makes statements that should under normal circumstances come as music to the ears of Ankara and Baku, the more the latter appear to double down on criticism of Yerevan.
Aliyev called Armenia effectively a 'fascist state,' claiming that Baku might have no other choice but to 'destroy' its neighbor's so-called 'fascist ideology.'
The discord between Armenia under the leadership of Pashinyan and Russia has no doubt helped Baku’s military operation to get back Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.
As Russia was distracted by the war in Ukraine, its role remained limited in the peace talks between Baku and Yerevan.
A peace deal in Ukraine under Russia’s terms, as US President Donald Trump appears to offer to Moscow, could strengthen the hands of Vladimir Putin, who might turn his attention to its near abroad with a more assertive posture.
“Azerbaijan appears to prefer a weak Armenia under Russian control than an independent pro-Western Armenia who will become stronger in time,” a Western observer told me.
Turkey’s policy in the Caucasus ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been to weaken the regional countries' dependence on Russia by encouraging their integration into international markets via connectivity projects. Ankara tried to increase its influence in the former Soviet republics without antagonizing Russia.
But Turkey lacks leverage against Baku. Turkey’s shaky economic situation renders Erdoğan highly vulnerable to Aliyev, who has been smart enough to invest heavily in Turkey and invite pro-government companies for construction work in the newly liberated Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, energy remains a crucial bond between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Baku plays an important role in Turkey's aspiration to become an energy hub connecting natural gas producers to its east and south with markets to the west.
Turkey has been proposing to re-export Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Bulgaria to diminish Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Yet, even the prospect of cooperation on energy is not incentivizing Aliyev to improve relations with Europe. On the contrary, Baku is increasingly angry about the European support of Yerevan and has endorsed aggressive policies against certain capitals, namely Paris.
