Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş has launched consultations with party group leaders on a proposed commission to address the Kurdish issue, aiming to establish the body before Parliament goes into recess.
In Turkey, a köprü (bridge) is never just a bridge. This week, the Bosphorus Bridge—officially renamed the “15 July Martyrs Bridge” after the 2016 coup attempt—became a stage for protest. A group of CHP deputies climbed onto the structure and unfurled a massive banner reading: “Free İmamoğlu” right before the CHP leader and his guests from the Socialist International would cross it. The message was direct: release Istanbul’s elected mayor, jailed on charges widely condemned as political. Only a few hours before that, the members of the Socialist International had raised a similar banner in their meeting.
In the 1970s, Turkey was plagued by deadly street clashes that claimed at least 10 lives a day. One of the bloodiest moments came in 1977, when the May Day rally in Istanbul’s Taksim Square turned into a massacre after shots were fired into the crowd, killing over 30 people. The ongoing ban on May Day rallies in Taksim dates back to that tragedy. As the violence escalated, conventional media outlets repeatedly asked, “Where is Turkey heading?” The era came to a close with the military coup of September 12, 1980.
In Turkish politics, few words are as loaded—or as likely to provoke presidential rage—as “cunta.” From its etymological roots in the Spanish resistance to Napoleonic rule (junta, meaning a council), cunta has acquired a sinister sheen along the way. Today, it conjures images not of patriotic committees, but of tanks on boulevards, generals behind microphones, and constitutions suspended by decree (Bet you’ve heard that last one before). So when CHP Chair Özgür Özel recently accused the ruling bloc of staging a “civilian coup”—sivil darbe—and likened the government's tightening grip to a junta mentality, it landed like a Molotov cocktail in Turkey’s ever-combustible political arena.
“The first political party leader to be arrested since the September 12, 1980, military coup era after Selahattin Demirtaş.” The arrest of Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdağ was reported in the media with this headline. However, there is no other similarity that would warrant him being mentioned in the same sentence as Demirtaş. In fact, they belong to entirely different worlds and are entirely opposing figures. Özdağ has been in custody at Silivri Prison for a month since Jan. 21, 2025.
For some in Turkey whoever wins the White House in next week’s elections, it won’t make much difference. It might not be that simple. It is no secret that ever since the failed coup attempt in 2016, there has been bad blood between Ankara and the Democrats in Washington. The view that part of the U.S. establishment was close to the Gülenist movement and the lukewarm reaction shown to the coup attempt reinforced the conviction among AKP elites that had the coup succeeded, Washington was not going to shed tears for the toppling of the government.
İmam nikahı, or dini nikah (religious wedding), has long been a battleground for women’s rights activists who strongly oppose religious marriage and support strict penalties for imams and muftis (Muslim clergy) who conduct religious unions without first ensuring that the couple has undergone a civil ceremony. Turkey’s laws on marriage are regulated by the 1926 Civil Code, which abolished polygamy, introduced civil marriage, and mandated that any religious ceremony—should citizens of the newly established secular state choose to hold one—must follow civil registration in a municipal office. In villages, chieftains (elected officials) conduct the ceremony, while consular officers perform civil ceremonies for Turks abroad. Under the 1926 laws, religious officers—whether imams, priests, or rabbis in Turkey’s multi-faith society— had no authority to perform official weddings, as they cannot verify the legal requirements, such as the age of the would-be spouses or whether they are already married.
In case you have yet to notice, the Presidential Couple loves marriage, family, and many children. This love, of course, is echoed in policy-making. Since the AKP came to power, the government has introduced a series of measures to encourage young people to get married, including subsidies and housing for university students who want to get married while still at school and “marriage credits,” long-term, low-interest loans for those between 18 and 30.