Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
Ankara’s signal that its “institutionalized good relations” with Hungary will continue even as the Turkish opposition congratulated Magyar as observers draw parallels between Orbán’s rule and Erdoğan’s.
The main opposition, the CHP, has had a tough year of operations targeting its municipalities and lawsuits against its party congress. According to party officials, the appointment of Akın Gürlek — who oversaw the municipal investigations — as justice minister signals that the road to elections may become even more challenging.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opted not to attend the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-led Board of Peace in Washington — much like he previously declined to travel to Davos for the initiative’s launch — signaling a calibrated diplomatic balancing act. While Erdoğan is among the few leaders known to have a personal rapport with U.S. President Donald Trump, he refrained from participating in both events hosted by Trump. Instead, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan represented Turkey on both occasions.
The newly released U.S. Strategic Security paper signals the most significant shift in American grand strategy since the end of the Second World War. Its defining features are the explicit identification of China as a peer competitor, the reaffirmation of Russia as a principal adversary, and—perhaps most striking—the retreat from the ideological mission that once sustained “the West” as a political and civilizational project.
İsmet Sayhan, the former head of the state-owned Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) and a close associate of MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli, was arrested in Ankara. Amid speculation that the detention was a sign of cracks in the ruling alliance, Bahçeli and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met in Bitlis’s Ahlat and Malazgirt on Aug. 25–26, posing for cameras to signal the strength of their alliance in their first meeting since July 10. They even listened to folk songs together.
“When good bureaucrats retire, they go to Istanbul,” quipped a Turkish diplomat at his farewell dinner several years ago. He was about to join the steady flow of ex-ambassadors and senior officials who settle comfortably into Istanbul’s glamorous private sector. While these bureaucrats enjoy Istanbul’s cosmopolitan delights and lucrative board positions, politicians with unsatisfied ambitions would do well to think twice. The graceful transition from bureaucracy-laden Ankara to Istanbul’s cultural and economic limelight might be liberating—but for politicians, it often signals the end of the line. Take Abdullah Gül, who leads the parade of high-profile politicians who found themselves in Istanbul once their grip on Ankara slipped. Gül, the soft-spoken Number Two to Erdoğan at the founding of AKP, left the presidency in 2014 with considerable bitterness, feeling sidelined by Erdoğan and his team. Settling first in Tarabya’s Presidential Palace and then in a private villa in Beykoz, he became a figure whom former allies and even foes sought out for advice on new parties, and periodically as a possible challenger to Erdoğan. Yet, Gül never took the plunge, proving that the view from Istanbul is often one of wistful distance from real political clout.