By Barçın Yinanç
The deal to resolve the case over allegations that Halkbank helped Iran evade American sanctions was announced on March 9, at the height of U.S.-Israeli attacks against Iran.
A court document dated March 6 revealed the details of the deal.
“[D]iplomatic discussions between the United States and the Republic of Turkiye led to assistance from Turkiye that was instrumental in the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s commitment to release all remaining hostages,” it said.
The case against Halkbank was paused for 90 days on March 11 to let the state-run lender demonstrate compliance with the terms of the deal.
The bank said it would not pay any judicial or administrative fines.
In view of the fact that other European banks had to pay huge fines, this is the best deal Halkbank could get. The development is certainly welcome news for the AKP government, which relies on state banks, especially at times of elections.
BARGAIN BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
The details of the deal prove the grand bargain that has been negotiated between Washington and Ankara.
Some of the elements of the bargain had already surfaced last autumn. While Turkey used its leverage to convince Hamas to accept the ceasefire with Israel, Washington used its leverage over the YPG to accept a deal with Syria’s new ruler, Ahmad Al-Sharaa.
Ankara convinced Hamas to abide by Trump’s plan, whose second phase following the ceasefire is highly ambiguous in terms of securing Palestinians’ rights. Washington in return pledged to end its cooperation with the YPG.
It now appears that ending the years-long prosecution of Halkbank was part of the grand bargain.
A NEW PHASE ON THE EDGE?
If Ankara and Washington were to find a solution to the S-400 stalemate, another major irritant in bilateral ties would be removed, ending decades of tension between the two capitals.
The deployment this week of the U.S. Patriot system to Malatya could also be interpreted as a signal that a breakthrough may be drawing closer.
While problems that have been poisoning relations are on their way to being resolved, the government does not appear cheerful.
Take the case of the deployment of Patriots following two missile attacks from Iran.
The statement by the Defense Ministry did not specify which country was sending the system and avoided mentioning that it would be deployed to protect the radar at Kürecik in Malatya.
This omission could be explained by two factors.
First, while some irritants — such as disagreements over Syria or the Halkbank case — appear to be moving toward resolution, it remains difficult for the AKP leadership to be seen as aligned with the Trump administration, whose policies are widely perceived in Turkish society as closely mirroring those of Israel. Some believe that had the country not hosted the radar at Kürecik, it would not have become a potential target for missile attacks.
Second, the issue of missile defense systems has not only left a bitter imprint on Turkey’s institutional memory but has also become a key source of friction in bilateral relations.
PATRIOTS AND PURCHASE OF S-400S
The first deployment of Patriots took place in 1991, during the first Gulf crisis, followed by the second during the second Gulf crisis in 2003. As European allies were uneasy with the U.S. attack on Iraq, the consent to deploy Patriots was not issued as quickly as the first time. This prompted Ankara to finalize the acquisition criteria for a national anti-missile defense system. Joint production and transfer of technology were among the criteria that became the main obstacles to the purchase of Patriot systems. In addition, deteriorating relations with the Western capitals further complicated negotiations.
By 2013, when negotiations with French-Italian offers also failed, Turkey announced plans to coproduce a long-range air and missile defense system with a Chinese company. The announcement sent shock waves through NATO, eventually forcing Turkey to cancel the plans.
The same year, on Turkey’s demand due to the civil war in Syria, U.S., Dutch and German Patriots were deployed in the country’s southeast. But all of them were retrieved within a year, leaving a bitter taste in Turkey. While the U.S. said it had to do maintenance work, the deteriorating political environment led the Germans to pull back much earlier than they promised.
The Patriot system sent by Spain and deployed at the İncirlik base has been there for more than a decade and Madrid has resisted pressure to send it to Ukraine.
The tepid reaction of Western capitals to the coup attempt of 2016 deepened the AKP’s suspicions of the West, prompting the purchase of Russian-made S-400s.
Convinced that the Democrat administration mismanaged the issue, Donald Trump called for a new round of negotiations, which again failed. The delivery of S-400s then led to the exclusion of Turkey from the joint production of F-35s as well as the implementation of sanctions.
The stalemate also delays an understanding over the modernisation of F16s as well as the possible purchase of F-35s. At a time when missiles are flying over Turkey, the S-400 system for which Ankara paid 1.3 billion dollars remains in its packaging.
