The collapse of the half-century-long Assad dynasty following the flight of Bashar Assad to Russia on Dec. 8, 2024 overjoyed pro-government circles here. Some even started to mention Aleppo as Turkey’s 82nd province, while the shares of cement and construction companies surged on the stock exchange.
As the first anniversary of opposition forces' takeover of Damascus approaches, the joy has been replaced by cautious optimism, if not outright anxiety.
While Syria has become an indirect battleground between Turkey and Israel, the contentious talks between Damascus and the Kurdish entity in the north continue to affect the so-called Terror-Free Turkey process negatively. Syria’s stability is shaky, making it difficult for the return of refugees, another high priority for the AKP government.
Is the glass half full?
Initially, developments in Syria took a direction seemingly favorable for Turkey, as the regime change coincided with the presidential handover in Washington.
Trump appointed his close friend, businessman Tom Barrack, as ambassador to Ankara and special envoy to Syria.
Later in the year evidence appeared that Ahmad al-Sharaa, who abandoned his nom de guerre and shed his combat fatigues in favor of a suit and tie, was no stranger to either British or U.S. intelligence.
Trump was very quick to approve him, making it easier for him to gain acceptance in the international community.
Meeting al-Sharaa in Riyadh, Trump announced that U.S. sanctions on Syria would be lifted, a crucial decision for Syria’s efforts to get up on its feet.
A NEW ‘PROCESS’ IN TURKEY
The regime change in Syria coincided with the early stages of a new reconciliation process regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
The PKK responded positively to the government’s new initiative, yet the most complicated issue remained the question of how the PYD-YPG structure—long described by Ankara as “the PKK’s branch in Syria”—would be positioned under Syria’s new regime.
While Damascus and the YPG reached an agreement on March 10, the terms, which included the integration of armed groups into the Syrian army, had still not been fully implemented by December 2025.
The PKK announced in July that it had dissolved itself and would lay down arms, but the YPG is reluctant to give up its arms and the gains it has secured as an autonomous administration in northeastern Syria.
IMPACT ON TERROR-FREE TURKEY PROCESS
The ambiguous stance over the domestic “reconciliation process” affects the process in Syria, as Ankara pressures al-Sharaa to stand against the demands of the YPG. The AKP government has demonized the YPG as no different than the PKK for at least a decade. Should the YPG maintain an autonomous status without giving up its arms, the AKP could become the target of criticism by a public that remains highly suspicious of the process.
Although top Turkish officials frequently assert that the YPG poses a threat to Turkey’s national security, there remains a persistent ambiguity in the official discourse, according to retired Ambassador Ömer Önhon.
“This ambiguity can be attributed to Turkey’s tendency to adjust its approach in parallel with evolving domestic political dynamics and developments beyond its borders, as well as to the differing views within the ruling party, its coalition partner, and various state institutions. It also reflects the sensitivities arising from the serious concerns and objections held by a significant portion of the Turkish public regarding the process,” wrote Önhon, who was Turkey’s envoy to Syria before the civil war.
ISRAEL-TURKEY DISAGREEMENT OVER SYRIA
Israel’s stance on Syria’s new regime presented another headache for Ankara.
Israel declared that Kurdish forces in northern Syria and the Druze in the south were its natural allies. Ankara believes Israel is provoking the Druze minority in the south to rebel against Damascus.
In contrast to Ankara, Israel prefers a weak and fragmented Syria and objects to Turkey’s increasing clout.
Currently, Israel is seen as the main destabilizing force in Syria by Ankara. Turkey, which sees Syria’s normalization as essential for regional stability, also wants the country rebuilt swiftly so that Syrian refugees can return as soon as possible. But as the first anniversary of the regime change approached, Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement that 550,000 Syrians had returned demonstrated that the remaining 2.5 million still have serious reservations about going back.
