By Barçın Yinanç
Two issues will be of priority in Turkish foreign policy in 2025: post-Assad Syria and the war in Ukraine.
Both will be closely linked to the policy preferences of the U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.
As the U.S. leader is expected to stop the war in Ukraine, Turkey will be watching his efforts closely and will seek a role to facilitate a reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia, and between Moscow and the West.
As most of the European capitals will approach half-heartedly Trump’s search for at least a ceasefire, the U.S. president will find a supportive NATO ally in Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will highlight his good relations with Ukrainian and Russian leaders. While Trump’s team might not be that enthusiastic about including Turkey in peace talks, Erdoğan will try to please Trump by providing support from an important regional country that backs his approach to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
Winning Trump’s appreciation will be crucial to convincing him on matters related to Syria, the biggest issue that will top the country’s agenda in 2025.
Erdoğan will again try to use his rapport with Trump to stop U.S. support for the YPG, which Ankara claims to be PKK’s wing in Syria. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Trump’s designated national security advisor reiterated the president-elect’s policy of having no boots on the ground in the Middle East. Yet, it is highly likely that his team backed by the Pentagon and the CIA might convince him to keep a small amount of military personnel in Syria and continue supporting the YPG to protect it from Turkish attacks.
Turkey wants to put an end to the YPG and has said non-Syrian Kurds should leave the country.
OFFER FOR JOINT MECHANISM IN SYRIA
Syria’s de facto ruler, who now uses his real name Ahmad al-Sharaa, said Kurdish forces will be integrated into the Ministry of Defense and that Syria will not allow its territory as a launchpad for attacks by the PKK.
Ankara will try to weaken the U.S. argument that the fight against ISIS requires the presence of U.S. forces and cooperation with the YPG, which also controls the prisons and camps where thousands of ISIS militia and their families are kept.
Turkey might offer to have a joint mechanism to fight ISIS, and could also come up with certain formulas to assume the control of these camps. Ankara would not want to see a quick and hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces lead to a power vacuum helping ISIS to resurrect. A temporary Turkish-U.S. mechanism would enable a more controlled withdrawal that can take place in phases.
In exchange, Ankara will try to remain relentless in its request to see the end of the U.S.- YPG relationship, which Washington defends with three “Ts”: tactical, transactional, and temporary.
Just as Turkish diplomacy convinced Russia and Iran to abandon Assad, it will also try to convince the US and its allies to abandon the YPG. Just as Moscow and Tehran’s decision to drop Assad enabled a takeover of Damascus by the opposition without bloodshed, a similar change of heart will also minimize bloodshed provided Turkey promises not to force Syrian National Army members to attack YPG forces, once a meaningful formula is found for the gradual dissolution of the YPG.
This issue is no doubt related to the so-called “peace process” that started last fall, when MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli made an appeal to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Two members of the DEM Party visited Öcalan on Dec. 28, adding a new impetus to a process that remains highly ambiguous.
SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
Meanwhile, Ankara will also try to secure support for the transitional government in Damascus from both Western governments but also the Arab world, especially the oil-rich Gulf countries. Turkey has a major interest in seeing gradual normalization of the country as the beginning of the return of refugees could open the door to Erdoğan’s re-election as president.
Israel’s stance on Syria will be crucial since Trump and his team will be open to messages coming from the Netanyahu government. The Israeli prime minister could try to convince Trump to keep supporting the YPG. His views would also factor in terms of how the new administration in Washington will approach the Syrian transitional government.
While relations between Turkey and Israel remain on ice, a possible ceasefire in Gaza could revive back-channel diplomacy between the two.
Ankara will also try to convince Western capitals to lend support to the new era in Syria, arguing this will facilitate the return of refugees. While it might get the support of countries like Germany and Italy, France, Greece and Greek Cyprus might block a more generous stance from the EU.
