By Cengiz K. Fırat
For the past decade, Turkey’s Africa policy has favored partnership — co-designed projects, capacity building, and trade — over extractive habits associated with colonial legacies. Two countries once written off as “failed states,” Somalia and Burkina Faso, illustrate this shift. Both are edging back toward firmer state capacity under locally led agendas, with Turkey positioned as a security and development partner rather than a patron.
SOMALIA: SECURITY FIRST, BUT ANCHORED IN STATE-BUILDING
Turkey’s most visible footprint in Somalia is Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, opened in 2017 and described as Turkey’s largest overseas base. It has trained several thousand Somali soldiers, including the Gorgor commandos who are central to operations against al-Shabaab. The camp functions as a defense university and long-term training hub rather than a transient expeditionary outpost.
The relationship deepened in 2024 with a ten-year Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The deal tasks Turkey with rebuilding and training the Somali navy and bolstering maritime law enforcement, while also envisaging support to develop offshore resources. Crucially, Turkey now patrols Somalia’s exclusive economic zone under this agreement, projecting maritime power in the Horn.
Tensions rose last week when a Turkish warship entered the port of Berbera in Somaliland as a show of force. The move followed an incident in which the Somaliland coast guard intercepted a Turkish vessel bound for Mogadishu, allegedly carrying military shipments. Ankara’s swift response underscored both its willingness to defend Somali sovereignty and its determination not to allow regional rivals to undermine the pact. The same strain was evident when Somaliland accused Turkey of meddling after its ambassador met with former rebel leader Sultan Wabar, even though Ankara does not recognize Somaliland.
Somali officials and many citizens view Turkish engagement as practical help — training, infrastructure, and scholarships—delivered with continuity since the 2011 famine response and without the baggage of colonial actors. Regionally, however, the maritime pact and naval standoff have been closely scrutinized, particularly after Ethiopia’s controversial deal with Somaliland. For analysts, Turkey’s presence is a test of whether soft-power goodwill can be matched with lasting security guarantees.
BURKINA FASO: A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT AND WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH
In the Sahel, defense cooperation has been the on-ramp to a broader agenda. Burkina Faso took delivery of Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2022, integrating them into counter-insurgency operations. Reports suggest the fleet has since expanded and is in regular use.
But the relationship is not limited to defense. A bilateral investment treaty entered into force in 2019, creating a framework for Turkish private capital. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) projects have multiplied—from vocational training to a milestone medical achievement: in August 2025, with TİKA’s backing, a Turkish team helped perform Burkina Faso’s first kidney transplant. Education links also grow via the Turkish Maarif Foundation’s schools. Trade, while still modest, has risen sharply in 2025.
Local reactions in Burkina Faso emphasize sovereignty and deliverables. The government praises suppliers that transfer usable capability quickly, and many citizens respond to visible results—areas reopened to commerce, new clinics, functioning schools—more than to geopolitical narratives. Rights groups, however, warn that drone-led campaigns risk civilian harm and require stricter oversight.
RUFFLED FEATHERS IN OLD CAPITALS
France’s role has shrunk in both theaters. In the Sahel, Paris’s withdrawal coincided with the rise of alternative partners, including Turkey. French outlets note how Turkish drones (and Russian aircraft) have changed both the air war and the information environment, fueling sovereigntist narratives that sideline France. In the Horn, the maritime pact was read in Europe through a competition lens, with some analysts questioning Ankara’s capacity and intent even as Somali institutions welcomed the help.
WHY THE MODEL RESONATES
First, Turkey’s cadence—train and equip in Somalia, then scale whole-of-government programs in Burkina Faso—matches local priorities. In Mogadishu, security had to come first; only then can ports and fisheries governance mature. In Ouagadougou, drones are a tool alongside investment rules, schools, and health partnerships. Second, Turkey’s “demand-driven” development style via TİKA is perceived as less prescriptive than traditional aid models. Third, trade increasingly follows the flag.
Another reason for acceptance is that countries like Somalia and Burkina Faso see Turkey as less of a threat to their sovereignty than the U.S., China, the EU, or old colonial rulers. Ankara positions itself as a partner that supports rather than dictates, offering tools for self-sufficiency.
Finally, Turkey has refined its African approach more consistently than Russia, which has also gained ground in the Sahel through Wagner-linked security deals. While Moscow provided quick fixes, it is bogged down in Ukraine and unable to deploy the same whole-of-government instruments—trade, education, development—that Ankara combines with its security support. The contrast underscores why Turkish engagement is seen as longer term and more sustainable.
None of this guarantees success. Somalia’s reforms hinge on sustained financing and institution-building; the Sahel’s conflicts are political as much as military. Yet the partnership template—locally led agendas, shared risk, and visible civil benefits—helps explain why Turkey’s presence in Africa lands as cooperation rather than tutelage, excites local constituencies, and ruffles feathers in Europe’s old capitals.
