By Barçın Yinanç
The free trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and India has reopened an old wound in Turkey–EU relations, once again exposing the long-standing impasse over trade integration with Ankara.
Turkey has been seeking the modernization of the EU–Turkey Customs Union for more than a decade. Yet the country’s call for an update has been the most crucial victim of the deterioration of political relations between Ankara and Brussels.
Enjoying relative economic prosperity driven by an impressive growth rate in its first decade in government, the ruling AKP decided to tap into anti-Western sentiment both in Turkey and among Turks living in Europe to consolidate its conservative voters, especially after the 2013 Gezi protests. (2008 amendment to the electoral law enabled overseas voters to vote, and external voting was first realized in the presidential elections of 2014.) EU-bashing came in parallel with democratic backsliding in Turkey.
A window of opportunity opened in 2015 to start negotiations on updating the EU–Turkey Customs Union. Despite poor chemistry between Turkey and Germany, the refugee crisis of 2015 pushed the German government to strike a deal with Ankara, with a promise to place the EU–Turkey Customs Union modernization on the agenda. Yet the coup attempt of 2016 not only further deepened democratic backsliding in Turkey, it was also followed by a series of crises with key capitals in Europe.
In March 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called Dutch politicians fascists when the Dutch government tried to bar Turkish politicians from campaigning in the Netherlands.
In August 2017, Erdoğan called Germany's three main political parties “enemies of Turkey” ahead of parliamentary elections and urged Turks living in Germany not to vote for them. While then-Chancellor Angela Merkel was accused of being a neo-Nazi, Erdoğan also criticized Olaf Scholz’s policy on Gaza, blaming it on “Nazi guilt.”
He also had a stormy relationship with France’s President Emmanuel Macron, telling him to “check his brain” after the French leader described NATO as “brain-dead.”
While Erdoğan’s constituency was exhilarated, even secular segments of society could not hide their satisfaction with the EU-bashing.
To think that these spats would have no consequences is simply naive. Citing democratic backsliding, the EU effectively decided to suspend relations with Ankara in June 2018, and the institutional relationship remained largely frozen until recently.
COVID-19, ANOTHER MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Time and again, Turkey–EU relations have faltered at moments of opportunity. COVID-19 provided an important opening, as disruptions in global supply chains revealed the importance of near-shoring. Calls from business circles that Turkey should seize this moment to become a major production hub for Europe fell on deaf ears, as the Erdoğan government chose instead to further erode the rule of law.
In addition, Erdoğan has shown little appetite for lobbying Brussels and did not actively push for an update of the EU–Turkey Customs Union.
CONCERNS AMONG BUSINESS CIRCLES OVER SUCCESSIVE FTAs
The EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement, followed by the free trade agreement with India, has once again started ringing alarm bells among business circles in Turkey.
“The customs union has lost its meaning” was the headline of the financial newspaper Ekonomim. Some pundits prefer to blame the EU for its “strategic myopia.”
“They called us the sick man of Europe 173 years ago. But now they are the sick man,” wrote journalist Şeref Oğuz in an article highly critical of the EU. According to Oğuz, the EU is disintegrating and is now attacking Turkey’s customs union. Asking for visas from European countries, as well as using the “refugee card,” are among his policy suggestions.
Other analysts offer more sober assessments and point to structural risks for both sides.
“The situation is becoming strategically unsustainable for both sides,” wrote Riccardo Gasco, the Foreign Policy Program Coordinator at the IstanPol Institute.
“Türkiye risks gradual competitiveness erosion and corridor marginalization unless it improves legal certainty and investment credibility, while the EU risks strategic myopia by leaving a structurally relevant neighbor in institutional limbo precisely as it seeks resilience, de-risking, and stronger security partnerships in its wider region,” Gasco wrote.
Ankara cannot respond to the EU’s accelerating trade agenda with rhetoric alone, he argued. “If the EU–Turkey Customs Union upgrade is to become politically viable in Europe, Ankara must narrow the ‘trust gap’ that has accumulated over the past decade.”
AMENDMENT OF ANTI-TERRORISM LAW; MOVEMENT ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE
Indeed, the ruling coalition could take steps in two areas that would help prepare the ground for the EU to revisit the EU–Turkey Customs Union update.
The ongoing reconciliation process provides a solid basis for amending the anti-terrorism law.
Another step that could help unblock a potential Greek Cypriot veto would be to greenlight the resumption of intercommunal talks on the island. While the ruling coalition is still believed to maintain its position on a “two-state solution,” the election of Tufan Erhürman as president of Turkish Cyprus could be used as an opportunity to revive the talks.
