By Can Öztaş
On Nov. 3, Britain and France announced the first exercise of the multinational force meant to support a future peace in Ukraine. Some 2,800 troops from 11 countries would rehearse their deployment in Poland. Turkish forces would set up the maritime component in Istanbul and practice clearing mines, so that commercial shipping could one day return to Ukrainian ports.
A week later, in Abu Dhabi, American envoys met Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, NATO and the European Commission. They were coordinating positions on the security guarantees that might accompany a settlement and on the shape of European security after the war. Turkey was absent.
It was an interesting division of labor. Ankara would clear the mines. Others would discuss the peace.
The meeting opened another round of American-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine, the first since February. Earlier rounds produced prisoner exchanges and little else.
The stakes go well beyond Ukraine. Jared Kushner has said that a lasting settlement will require direct engagement between Russia and the Europeans on the wider security arrangements that affect them. Moscow could hardly have put it better. Russia has been trying to rewrite Europe’s security arrangements for years. It now sees the war as a chance to finish the draft.
Turkey, a NATO member with the alliance’s second-largest armed forces, a Black Sea coastline and control of the Turkish Straits, might reasonably expect a seat at such a table. Particularly under a government that rarely misses a chance to call the country a major international power. A major power is, among other things, one that gets invited.
THE USEFUL OUTSIDER
There is an uncomfortable history behind the empty chair.
Ankara has kept its lines open to both Moscow and Kyiv throughout the war. It hosted negotiations in Istanbul, helped broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative, facilitated prisoner exchanges and supplied Ukraine with military equipment.
All this has brought Turkey a great deal of visibility. Whether it has brought influence is a harder question.
Realists measure power partly by what others need from you, and by what you can obtain in return. Turkey has made itself available for almost any task. That may have made it rather too convenient.
Europe has found a modern use for an old Ottoman institution. The embassies in Pera once relied on dragomans, interpreters who carried every message and signed none. Ankara now plays the part. Migration has its arrangement, trade has another and Black Sea security now has a third. Cooperation proceeds where interests meet. Political disagreements wait in the hall.
Ankara has been a willing party to this. Strategic autonomy lets it keep its relations with Russia, negotiate on its own account and ignore European positions it finds inconvenient. The European Commission’s Nov. 4 report puts Turkey’s alignment with EU foreign-policy statements and sanctions decisions at 4%, up from 3% a year earlier. Ankara has also declined to join European sanctions against Russia.
These choices have their advantages. Without them, there would have been no talks in Istanbul. Trust is not among them.
Italy, which has neither a Black Sea coast nor a border with Russia, was in the room. Poland and Romania were not. Both have serious security interests on the same front. Neither, however, has made global diplomatic leadership quite so central to its foreign policy. Absence is easier to bear if you haven’t announced your arrival.
THE SMALL PRINT OF PEACE
In July, in Kyiv, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed that Turkey had agreed to lead the maritime component of Ukraine’s proposed security guarantees. Planning among allied navies was already underway. Nobody has yet said what exactly Turkey would be guaranteeing, or who would decide when to act.
The history of security guarantees offers limited comfort. Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal on its soil and received assurances on its sovereignty and borders from Russia, Britain and the United States. The language was solemn. Ukraine still has the memorandum.
The verbs in any Ukrainian settlement will deserve far more attention than its adjectives.
Then there is Montreux. The convention governs the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits, and any naval arrangement that depends on reaching the Black Sea must respect it. Turkey does not command the sea beyond the Bosphorus. It does, however, keep the door.
Perhaps the format was simply small. We do not know whether Ankara asked to attend. Whatever the reason, the episode exposes a familiar weakness in Turkey’s relations with Europe. Its contributions are welcome. Its responsibilities are recognized. Its political participation remains a matter for further consultation.