By Barçın Yinanç
The political and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s benefited both in terms of their relations with Syria. Following Turkey’s threat to use force, Syrian then-President Hafez Al-Assad decided to end his policy of providing safe haven to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
After being forced to leave Syria in October 1998, Öcalan was abducted by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization from Nairobi in February 1999. U.S. and Israeli intelligence played a critical role in Turkey’s effort to chase and abduct Öcalan. PKK members demonstrated in front of Israeli embassies to protest its involvement. Three Kurdish protesters were shot and killed while trying to occupy the Israeli consulate in Berlin.
In short, Turkey and Israel cooperated against both the Assad regime and the PKK.
With the fall of the Assad regime, some in the two countries claim they now share a common border (as both have a military presence in Syria) and that the discord between the two governments can lead to an armed confrontation.
ISRAEL IS USING ‘KURDISH CARD’
With Assad gone and Western support in limbo, the YPG, which is the PKK’s wing in Syria, found itself in a very precarious situation.
Just as Ankara is pressuring its Western allies to drop the YPG, Israeli authorities have been voicing support for the “Kurds.”
It is striking that Gideon Saar, who was appointed foreign minister in November, said Israel should reach out to Kurds, the moment he took office.
“The Kurdish people are a great nation, one of the great nations without political independence,” he said at his inauguration ceremony, describing Kurds as a “natural ally.”
Once allies against the PKK, how did the two countries turn against each other and how did Israel come as far as lending support to what Ankara sees as an “existential threat”?
RISE OF RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY
The short answer is a common phenomenon both countries have been suffering: the rise of nationalist right-wing ideology and the backsliding in democratic culture.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his inner circle harbor a disproportionate attachment to the Palestinian cause. While Turkish society has always been sensitive to the Palestinian problem, Turkish Islamists' ideological compassion for the Palestinian cause is not shared by secular segments of the society.
Yet, Erdoğan’s rule has coincided with the most right-wing government in Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been uncompromising on the rights of Palestinians.
The last decade has seen the consolidation of power of these two leaders.
Determined to do anything to stay in power, both leaders became more dependent on the extreme right-wing and ultra-conservative forces in their countries.
In parallel, democratic culture suffered in both countries, which were once seen as the two sole democracies in the Middle East.
Democratic backsliding in Turkey is much greater than in Israel.
Still, facing trial on corruption cases, Netanyahu’s actions like overhauling the judiciary are seen as attempts to weaken the democratic institutions.
HAMAS’ OCTOBER 7 ATTACK
Meanwhile, the deadly Hamas Oct. 7 attack has strengthened the hand of Netanyahu, who was facing domestic difficulties. His strategy of attacking Lebanon and Iran is seen as an effort to increase the tension in the region to stay in power.
“I am leading a country through a seven-front war,” said Netanyahu in December when he became the first Israeli prime minister to take the stand as the defendant in a criminal trial.
Netanyahu has dealt deadly blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. Similarly, Israel has dealt humiliating strikes against Iran. Following the fall of the Assad regime, the new administration in Damascus has taken a hostile attitude against Iran.
As a result, Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ability to transfer advanced missiles and ammunition to Lebanon has been reduced. In addition, carrying out hundreds of strikes after Dec. 8, Israel destroyed 80% of the Syrian army's capabilities.
Following all these developments on the ground and with the upcoming pro-Israeli Trump administration, will Netanyahu be still fighting a seven-front war? How will the new situation on the ground affect Israeli threat perception? Will Netanyahu need new threats to consolidate his domestic standing?
ISRAEL’S NEW THREAT PERCEPTION
From Israel’s point of view, “the long-term risk is the rise of radical Sunni groups backed by Ankara, their approach to Israel’s border, and the possibility that the new Syrian system might deteriorate into endless internal power struggles,” wrote journalists Yaakov Lappin and Tal Beeri, which appears to be a reasonable analysis.
Yet in the same article, Turkey’s main strategic goals are highly exaggerated, with one of them formulated as: “the establishment of a Sunni Islamist client state that will be part of Erdoğan’s vision of restoring the Ottoman Empire (and as part of this, to build a Sunni-jihadist terror infrastructure against Israel in southern Syria).”
Meanwhile, a committee established by the government said Israel must prepare for a direct confrontation with Turkey. The Nagel Committee’s report, made public on Jan. 6, warned that “Turkey’s ambitions to restore its Ottoman-era influence could lead to heightened tensions with Israel, possibly escalating into conflict.”
TURKEY’S APPROACH
But Turkey’s reaction to Israeli action in Syria right after the fall of the Assad regime was very mild.
Israeli forces crossed the buffer zone and seized territory in Syrian-controlled areas of the Golan Heights. The Israeli government later approved a plan to expand settlements on the occupied Golan Heights.
When asked about Israel’s action in Syria, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan used moderate language, not legitimizing but providing a rather “rational” explanation from the Israeli point of view.
The Israeli state establishment should know that Ankara stands at a crucial moment in its quest to eradicate the PKK and find a solution to the “Kurdish” problem, and the last thing the Turkish state establishment would want is an armed confrontation with Israel.
Some Israelis might argue that there is no longer a distinction between the AKP and the state and that Islamist ideology would weigh over any other consideration thus turning Turkey into a state hostile to Israel.
To alleviate Israeli concerns, it would not be a surprise if Ankara sent direct or indirect messages to find a common ground in Syria trying to persuade them that Turkey would not encourage Syria’s new rulers to take hostile action against Israel.
The right-wing circles in Israel however, might find it harder to trust Turkey.
Erdoğan’s new motto “Turkey is bigger than Turkey,” together with euphoric statements from pro-AKP figures is giving enough argument to these circles to justify their lack of trust.
Yet, one should not exclude the possibility that right-wing power centers in Israel might intentionally prefer to keep a deaf ear to any reassurances from Turkey as they can use “Turkish hostility” for their new threat perception. It is also a possibility that the Netanyahu government might want to use the “Kurdish” card to punish Turkey for its Palestinian stance, or to force Turkey to change it.
No doubt Erdoğan continues to use the anti-Israeli sentiment among his own constituency.
On Dec. 22, as his supporters chanted, “Mr. President, take us to Jerusalem,” in Mardin not far from the Syrian border, Erdoğan responded by saying “Patience brings victory.” In October, Erdoğan said Israel laid eyes on Turkish territory.
But his words are seen as empty rhetoric, aimed at deviating attention from the economic crisis that has become more acute. Israel could take Erdoğan’s statements as “rhetoric for the domestic audience” or prefer to use it to escalate tension in the region.
At the end of the day, if extremist elements were to get the upper hand in both countries, not because the two countries' “national interests” clash but because of “domestic requirements,” that would set the two countries on a dangerous collision course.
