GOVERNMENT PROMOTES PEACE PLAN AS İYİ PARTY HEADS TO DIYARBAKIR
The AKP and MHP are gearing up to promote the “Terror-free Turkey” initiative on the ground, while the İYİ Party prepares a counter-move.
Analysis
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The AKP and MHP are gearing up to promote the “Terror-free Turkey” initiative on the ground, while the İYİ Party prepares a counter-move.
In Turkish, the term for ambassador has undergone a transformation as sweeping as the empire it once served. The old-fashioned word was “Sefir,” from the Arabic s‑f‑r root meaning “to bear a message,” and the highest rank was Sefir‑i Kebir—the Grand Envoy—complete with embroidered robes and horse-led fanfare. Today, the bureaucratic “Büyükelçi” literally means “great envoy,” yet, put in plain Turkish, it feels a little less illustrious.
After a decision to terminate the 1973 crude oil pipeline agreement with Iraq as of July 27, 2026, Turkey started negotiations with the Iraqi central government for a more comprehensive agreement on the transportation of Iraqi oil. The move is not a withdrawal from the partnership but a strategic reset. Under the 1973 agreement and its supplementary protocols, either party must notify the other at least one year before expiry if it intends to terminate the deal. If no such notice is given, the contract automatically renews for five years. Turkey has now officially informed Iraq of its intent to withdraw, preventing automatic renewal and opening space for renegotiation.
Parliament passed a legislative package on July 19 that enables mining in olive groves, triggering protests from opposition parties, locals, and environmental groups. The bill, which the AKP says is to address Turkey’s energy needs, passed with 255 votes in favor and 199 against.
In the most dramatic leadership overhaul at OYAK since the 2016 coup attempt, retired Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakallı—once a key figure in thwarting the coup—has been named chairman of the Turkish Armed Forces' influential pension fund and commercial powerhouse. OYAK announced the surprise changes just two months after its general assembly on May 17.
In the great Turkish game of semantics, few words do more political heavy lifting than süreç. Literally “process,” süreç is the bureaucrat’s fig leaf, the politician’s magic wand, and the journalist’s catch-all term when no one knows quite what to call a thing. It conjures movement without a very clear or declared direction, change without rupture, action without accountability. You don’t fail a süreç—you just manage it, drag it, or rebrand it.
Allegations of widespread cheating in Turkey’s national High School Entrance Exam (LGS) have triggered a political storm, with opposition figures accusing the Education Ministry of negligence and a cover-up, while Minister Yusuf Tekin has forcefully rejected the claims, using inflammatory language to discredit critics. More than a month after the exam, a senior official from the ministry has been dismissed.
After 47 years, the PKK has decided to disband and lay down arms. According to the group’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, this marks a paradigm shift: the struggle will now continue through strengthened political engagement. Following what both the government and opposition have called a “historic” decision, change is now expected within the DEM Party—the Kurdish political movement’s representative in Turkish Parliament. As one MP who recently visited Öcalan on İmralı Island put it: “Even the PKK is changing—why wouldn’t the DEM Party?”
The former head of Turkey’s media watchdog RTÜK, Zahid Akman, who served as editor-in-chief of pro-government broadcaster Kanal 7 for many years, has been replaced by Kanal 7 Ankara bureau chief Mehmet Acet.
A joint Turkish-UAE-Chinese venture is set to launch a comprehensive digital banking and payments platform in Turkey, marking an unusual cross-border collaboration that includes players from both the Gulf and China.
A Turkish ambassador serving in a Central Asian country before 2016 was criticized for not showing enough interest in the Gülenists schools. The envoy received several phone calls from AKP officials complaining he was not, for instance, visiting the schools frequently enough.
Despite strained ties with Israel following the October 7 attacks, Turkey has emphasized its key role in brokering a ceasefire in Syria’s Suweida province, where fighting between Israel-backed Druze groups and Bedouin Arab tribes had escalated to involve regime forces.