By Barçın Yinanç
The turn of events in Syria is related to three evolving issues: the war in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East, and the upcoming Trump 2.0.
Bashar al-Assad survived the civil war thanks to his powerful allies, Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah, which have all been weakened.
Russia has been bogged down in Ukraine and unrest in Georgia.
Iran has been subjected to severe blows from Israel. Its ally Hezbollah, has also been crippled by Israel’s attacks.
This was the best moment for the opposition forces to act.
A coalition of rebel groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a “surprise” offensive on Nov. 27. With little to no resistance from the Syrian regime and their allies, opposition forces were able to capture Syria’s second-largest city Aleppo within a day.
GREENLIGHT FROM ANKARA
According to Turkish commentators, the opposition offensive did not come as a surprise to Ankara. No doubt Ankara’s greenlight was a must, as the Syrian National Army (SNA) backed by Turkey also joined the offensive. What came as a surprise was the advances made by the opposition forces.
Many pro-government commentators said the offensive was postponed by Turkey, which tried to reach out to Assad to start a normalization process. Turkey’s tacit approval of the offensive appears to have come as a direct result of its frustration with Moscow and Tehran, which have avoided pushing Assad to sit down with Turkey but also with the Syrian opposition.
“Normalisation between Turkey and Syria is not among Iran’s priorities in Syria. From Russia’s perspective, that kind of issue is not on the agenda as Russia does not see a serious threat especially due to the ceasefire,” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told press members on Oct. 16.
FRUSTRATION WITH THE ASTANA PROCESS
According to Fidan, the other major players feel that continuing the process started in Astana is enough. Fidan implied that this situation was not sustainable.
“There is a growing threat because steps are not taken on the issue of refugees and the fight against terrorism,” he added. “We are for some solutions. But in case these efforts do not bear fruit with diplomacy and constructive approach then we will take other kinds of steps,” said Fidan in the same press meeting, in a way perhaps signaling the offensive.
FIDAN CHALLENGES IRANIAN COUNTERPART IN FRONT OF CAMERAS
Ankara’s frustration with the Astana process was also voiced during the Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Ankara.
Abbas Araghchi spoke of the “Israeli regime's efforts, supported by the U.S., to exploit the sensitive conditions in the region following unprecedented crimes and aggressions against the Palestinian people in Gaza and Lebanon, aiming to divert global attention from these atrocities.”
Trying to tap into the public’s sensitivity to the Palestinian issue and anger against Israel, he said recent activities by “terrorist groups in Syria and the spread of instability align with Zionist objectives.”
Fidan hit back at his counterpart by saying that attributing the Aleppo offensive to foreign intervention would be misguided.
“This is a mistake and a refuge for those unwilling to understand the realities in Syria,” he said.
Araghchi made the trip to Turkey after meeting with Assad, which led some to assume he might bring a message from the Syrian leader. However, according to Middle East Eye, this was not the case.
According to that report, Fidan rebuked his Iranian counterpart during the talks, saying that Assad and Iran had failed to participate genuinely in peace negotiations for years.
Fidan did not mince his words during the press conference. The relative calm following the Astana process should have been used as an opportunity for a grand political solution, said Fidan, adding the postponed problems can no longer be handled by the Astana process.
Fidan’s statements prove that Ankara’s frustration with the three capitals Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran has also opened the way for the offensive.
Meanwhile, Ankara must have believed in the benefit of a preemptive action ahead of Trump’s arrival which can be consequential for Syria. First of all, if Trump were to be successful in his pledge to end the war in Ukraine, that would strengthen the hands of Moscow as well as that of Damascus. As a result, Assad would turn much more intransigent on normalization. Second, there has always been suspicion in Ankara that Washington can reach an understanding with Moscow behind Ankara’s back.
At his meeting with the press on Oct. 16, a journalist asked Fidan about “allegations that there could be negotiations between Russia and the U.S. administration on Syria.”
In case there was a suspension or some reconciliation in the Ukraine-Russia war, they could talk about Syria, said Fidan. He also said: “It is very likely for the Americans to look for ways to protect the actors they have invested in before they withdraw from Syria.” He meant the YPG, which Turkey says is the PKK’s wing in Syria.
The unconfirmed news that the U.S. proposes to lift sanctions provided Syria distances itself from Iran might have increased Ankara’s frustration. Turkey does not want an international normalization process to start with Assad without forcing him to start an internal reconciliation process. That’s why the Arab League’s decision to greenlight Syria’s return to the organization without any condition was a mistake, in Ankara’s view.
ANKARA AND THE WEST ON THE SAME PAGE?
Meanwhile, the reaction of Western capitals is worth nothing.
“The current escalation only underscores the urgent need for a Syrian-led political solution to the conflict, in line with UNSCR 2254,” read a joint statement from the U.S., UK, France and Germany, on Dec 1st.
This was a rare instance when Ankara and Western capitals appeared to be on the same page in Syria.
While the offensive appears to serve Turkey’s stated goals in Syria, the new turn of events is not without risks. Turkey distances itself from the HTS as it is officially recognized as a terror organization. As pro-opposition commentators have criticized implicit cooperation between Turkey and the HTS, pro-government commentators warned against focusing too much on the HTS, claiming this was an offensive undertaken by all opposition forces.
Ankara had pledged to disarm “terrorist groups” in Idlib, according to the understanding reached during the Astana process. Yet, it lacks such leverage over the jihadist groups. So while one might assume a tacit understanding between Turkey and the HTS was in place for the recent offensive, the latter is not under the total control of Ankara. The disagreements that have surfaced between the HTS and the Syrian National Army attest to the limits of Turkey’s leverage over the HTS.
Another risk is a new flow of refugees towards the Turkish border if Russian and Syrian airforces were to attack Idlib province. Erdoğan and Putin held a telephone conversation where Putin underlined “the urgent need to stop radical groups’ terrorist aggression against the Syrian state and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate authorities’ efforts to restore stability and constitutional order across the country, including using Ankara’s capabilities in the region,” according to TASS.
Another risk is the Syrian National Army’s offensive towards the lines held by the YPG. The Turkey-backed SNA’s offensive against YPG militia can create headaches between Ankara and Washington.
With developments unfolding in the ground, all eyes are turned to a possible meeting between Turkish and Russian foreign ministers during the OSCE meeting in Malta on Dec. 6 and a possible trilateral meeting between Turkey, Russia, and Iran which will take place on Dec. 7 during the Doha forum.
