Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
At the turn of the year, a familiar ritual repeats itself in Turkey. Gyms raise their membership fees. Tradespeople adjust their prices. Real estate agents pocket higher commissions by systematically pushing up sale prices. Hardly anyone objects. Hardly anyone asks what added value is being offered. Price hikes are taken for granted — not because products have improved, but because inflation exists.
A new U.S. tariff move targeting countries that do business with Iran is placing billions of dollars of Turkey’s trade at risk, with exports to the United States and energy trade with Iran most exposed.
Broadly defined unemployment in Turkey has climbed close to 12 million, according to a December 2025 report by DİSK-AR, the research branch of the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey.
Feti Yıldız is not a “latecomer” but a nationalist raised in the movement — a core MHP figure. With the Kurdish peace process, he became the party’s most visible face after Devlet Bahçeli. At 71, he carries the aura of a character who stepped out of the classic Yeşilçam cinema of the 1970s, and onto the political stage — as if he came from there, yet without acting. He simply is who he is. Of course, he is not the lead role; that belongs to Bahçeli. But even if Yıldız looks like a character actor, his strength lies in being exactly what he appears to be. He is not one of those shapeshifting politicians. He steers clear of the MHP’s trademark overblown patriotic rhetoric. He avoids slogans. He usually answers journalists’ questions by staying within the framework of his profession — the law.
In Turkey, çubuklu pijama, or striped pajamas, means much more than bedtime. It’s the uniform of the “baba”: the modest patriarch who comes home, trades his jacket for cotton stripes, and settles in front of the evening news. A garment of thrift and decency, it once stood for the steady comfort of the lower middle class.
U.S. President Donald Trump will host Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the White House on Sept. 25, shortly after both leaders attend the UN General Assembly in New York. Their talks are expected to focus on defense and trade, including Boeing aircraft sales, a major F-16 package, and the potential revival of discussions on the suspended F-35 program.
It is not unusual for a Turkish citizen visiting China to receive a knock on the door in the middle of the night by a police officer. On my third day in China, I received a call from the reception telling me a police officer wanted to come up to my room to ask a few questions. I said that I would come down and while I was trying to get in touch with the German think-tank that had invited me to China, the receptionist and the police officer were at the door of my hotel room.
For the past decade, Turkey’s Africa policy has favored partnership — co-designed projects, capacity building, and trade — over extractive habits associated with colonial legacies. Two countries once written off as “failed states,” Somalia and Burkina Faso, illustrate this shift. Both are edging back toward firmer state capacity under locally led agendas, with Turkey positioned as a security and development partner rather than a patron.
Turkey and Syria have reached consensus on 10 new agreements with a target of $5 billion in trade.
Turkey and France, NATO allies and regional heavyweights, are locked in a relationship best described as a cocktail of competition, cooperation, and confrontation. Despite shared interests in trade and global security, Ankara and Paris appear increasingly out of step on strategic and ideological matters even as flashpoints multiply.
The United States has imposed sanctions on 22 entities linked to a shadow banking network accused of facilitating illicit oil trade on behalf of the Iranian regime. The network operates through front companies based in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong, funneling revenue to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the U.S. State Department announced on July 9.
The United States has imposed sanctions on 22 entities linked to a shadow banking network accused of facilitating illicit oil trade on behalf of the Iranian regime. The network operates through front companies based in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong, funneling revenue to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the U.S. State Department announced on July 9.