AKP’S ELECTION BILLS ON THE WAY
With the “Terror-Free Turkey” process on one hand and the row over operations targeting CHP-run municipalities on the other, it’s easy to forget that the country’s main problem is deepening poverty and social decay.
Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
With the “Terror-Free Turkey” process on one hand and the row over operations targeting CHP-run municipalities on the other, it’s easy to forget that the country’s main problem is deepening poverty and social decay.
MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli raised the bar this week in the Kurdish peace process he launched in October 2024. He proposed the “right to hope” for Abdullah Öcalan. What do we mean by the right to hope?
As the Turkish peace process with Kurds enters a period of turbulence following shifting dynamics and territorial changes in Syria, MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli, who initiated the process, has stepped up efforts to prevent it from unraveling even as rhetoric hardens between the ruling bloc and the DEM Party.
Turkey joined Damascus, welcoming the victory of Syrian government forces and the defeat of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which further strained the ongoing peace process. Tensions in the political arena rose after a Turkish flag was brought down during the DEM Party’s group meeting in the border town of Nusaybin, neighboring Qamishli. The name of the person who brought down the Turkish flag was not shared by the government, but an investigation was launched, while the DEM Party described the incident as a provocation, recalling similar instances from the past.
Following the PKK’s decision to lay down arms, the newly launched “peace process” has become tangled up in tensions over Syria. The military operation by the Damascus regime that pushed the SDF/YPG out of two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo has strained relations between the AKP–MHP alliance and the DEM Party, ending a cautious rapprochement as part of the process. It has also disrupted a positive atmosphere that had lasted for nearly a year, raising fresh doubts about the prospects of success.
After Damascus launched a military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the ruling AKP-MHP alliance linked the trajectory of Turkey’s peace process to developments in Syria.
The “new peace process” began with convention-shattering moves such as granting the “right to hope” to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and, after 15 months, is now not even back where it started. In fact, it has probably moved backward.
With the start of 2026, the future of the peace initiative on the Kurdish issue remains uncertain. The mandate of the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, which includes representatives from all parliamentary parties except the İYİ Party, was extended by two months, and the commission has once again delayed finalizing its report, now expected in January.
Although unions have refused to participate in the ongoing Minimum Wage Determination Commission meetings, the government is seeking their approval on the 2026 minimum wage — a move seen as an attempt to legitimize a process from which labor groups protest for being excluded.
As the Peace Commission moves toward drafting its final document — and as legislation looms on the horizon — the key question is whether parliament can transform overlapping objectives into a shared roadmap, or whether the process will once again stall at the fault line between security-first sequencing and demands for democratic and political normalization.
The new civil constitution that the AKP has been calling for since the 2023 elections is set to become one of the key issues in the new year. Revising the presidential system, addressing the needs of a new peace process, and — inevitably — paving the way for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s renewed candidacy are the main pillars of this process. But any such changes would first require consensus within the party, and then support from the opposition.
Feti Yıldız is not a “latecomer” but a nationalist raised in the movement — a core MHP figure. With the Kurdish peace process, he became the party’s most visible face after Devlet Bahçeli. At 71, he carries the aura of a character who stepped out of the classic Yeşilçam cinema of the 1970s, and onto the political stage — as if he came from there, yet without acting. He simply is who he is. Of course, he is not the lead role; that belongs to Bahçeli. But even if Yıldız looks like a character actor, his strength lies in being exactly what he appears to be. He is not one of those shapeshifting politicians. He steers clear of the MHP’s trademark overblown patriotic rhetoric. He avoids slogans. He usually answers journalists’ questions by staying within the framework of his profession — the law.