TURKEY’S NEW CHALLENGE: REBRANDING TERRORISTS
Soon after the AKP rulers felt secure enough against the country’s secular establishment, they started promoting Gülenists abroad. Foreign capitals were advised to work with Gülenist networks.
Analysis
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Soon after the AKP rulers felt secure enough against the country’s secular establishment, they started promoting Gülenists abroad. Foreign capitals were advised to work with Gülenist networks.
Naci Bostancı is an academic—political scientist, sociologist, and communications scholar. He currently serves as the rector of Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. But that’s not the whole story. For many years, he was a member of parliament, holding senior roles within the ruling AKP. At one point, he even occupied the position of second-in-command after President Erdoğan within the party hierarchy. In the 2023 elections, he chose not to run again and returned to academia.
In Turkish, çocuk simply means “child” — a small, willful person who believes the world should bend to their will. But in political life, çocuk is more than a noun: it is a litmus test. Unlike evlat, the solemn, Arabic-rooted term for “offspring,” çocuk suggests an individual, complete in themselves, not just a branch on a family tree. No surprise, then, that the AKP prefers evlat — a word that keeps people firmly tethered to family, lineage, and duty.
t has been seven months since MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli extended a hand to DEM Party members, and two months since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his organization to lay down arms. The PKK, which announced it would comply with the call, made its first request for Öcalan to be allowed to communicate with the organization in order to hold a dissolution congress. However, no concrete progress has been made on this request, which requires government action. This has led some to ask if the process is stalling or whether there is a problem between the AKP and the MHP.
Bülent Arınç. Most recently, he stirred controversy with his criticism of the cancellation of Ekrem İmamoğlu’s diploma and his detention. “Neighborhood” has become a widely used concept that reflects the deep polarization in Turkish politics. There’s an “AKP neighborhood,” we say, and there’s an “opposition neighborhood.” But with his remarks, which carried a tone of self-criticism, Arınç managed to draw a backlash from both his own neighborhood and its direct opposite. For those who know him, Arınç’s remarks came as no surprise. Throughout the AKP’s 23 years in power, he has been one of the few — perhaps the only — figures to voice such open dissent from within. Why? He puts it this way: “I have a certain weight of my own. I’m not like the others.”
“We are absolutely against this,” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told a group of AKP lawmakers about plans to depopulate the Gaza Strip, according to daily Hürriyet. This statement came amid a debate that broke out over the concept of Hijrah for Gazans.
Every time Turkey takes a big step backward and away from democratic rule, those familiar with Turkish-EU relations tend to also blame the Merkel-Sarkozy duo, who reined back Turkey’s accession talks in the mid-2000s at a time when the AKP was undertaking sweeping reforms to reach universal standards. It was the most serious and bitter wake-up call for those who still had faith in European values, that no matter what Turkey would do, it would never be considered a member of the European family, despite its NATO and Council of Europe membership.
The ruling AKP presents the fall of the Assad regime as a success story as well as vindication of its 13-year Syria policy which for many has meant turning the country into a vast migrant camp.
For some in Turkey whoever wins the White House in next week’s elections, it won’t make much difference. It might not be that simple. It is no secret that ever since the failed coup attempt in 2016, there has been bad blood between Ankara and the Democrats in Washington. The view that part of the U.S. establishment was close to the Gülenist movement and the lukewarm reaction shown to the coup attempt reinforced the conviction among AKP elites that had the coup succeeded, Washington was not going to shed tears for the toppling of the government.
“When good bureaucrats retire, they go to Istanbul,” quipped a Turkish diplomat at his farewell dinner several years ago. He was about to join the steady flow of ex-ambassadors and senior officials who settle comfortably into Istanbul’s glamorous private sector. While these bureaucrats enjoy Istanbul’s cosmopolitan delights and lucrative board positions, politicians with unsatisfied ambitions would do well to think twice. The graceful transition from bureaucracy-laden Ankara to Istanbul’s cultural and economic limelight might be liberating—but for politicians, it often signals the end of the line. Take Abdullah Gül, who leads the parade of high-profile politicians who found themselves in Istanbul once their grip on Ankara slipped. Gül, the soft-spoken Number Two to Erdoğan at the founding of AKP, left the presidency in 2014 with considerable bitterness, feeling sidelined by Erdoğan and his team. Settling first in Tarabya’s Presidential Palace and then in a private villa in Beykoz, he became a figure whom former allies and even foes sought out for advice on new parties, and periodically as a possible challenger to Erdoğan. Yet, Gül never took the plunge, proving that the view from Istanbul is often one of wistful distance from real political clout.
A week after the revelation of a scandal involving a criminal network that reaped profits by exploiting newborn babies, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vowed on Oct. 22 to take swift action. “As president of the republic, I will ensure that those monsters who destroyed the lives of babies never see the light of day again,” he pledged. The “Newborn Gang” scandal has cast a shadow over Erdoğan’s healthcare policies, a critical electoral stronghold for his Islamist-populist AKP.
In case you have yet to notice, the Presidential Couple loves marriage, family, and many children. This love, of course, is echoed in policy-making. Since the AKP came to power, the government has introduced a series of measures to encourage young people to get married, including subsidies and housing for university students who want to get married while still at school and “marriage credits,” long-term, low-interest loans for those between 18 and 30.