Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
The informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers, which will take place in Antalya on May 14, will put the international spotlight on Turkey as it will be the first meeting attended by Western leaders after the arrest of the Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 23.
The informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers, which will take place in Antalya on May 14, will put the international spotlight on Turkey as it will be the first meeting attended by Western leaders after the arrest of the Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 23.
t has been seven months since MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli extended a hand to DEM Party members, and two months since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his organization to lay down arms. The PKK, which announced it would comply with the call, made its first request for Öcalan to be allowed to communicate with the organization in order to hold a dissolution congress. However, no concrete progress has been made on this request, which requires government action. This has led some to ask if the process is stalling or whether there is a problem between the AKP and the MHP.
The Trump administration and Turkey got off to a good start but the relationship needs to mature, an American observer familiar with both sides told me when asked about the first 100 days.
My grand-aunt never used the word 'zorba' to describe a bully, though it would be the first term to come to mind for many Turkish speakers. Instead, when one of the boys in the family became too combative, she would say, 'What are you, a small 'Ali Kıran Başkesen'?' The phrase, which translates literally as 'Ali who crashes things and cuts heads,' is a Turkish term for an authoritarian bully. It derives from the proverb 'Dalı kıran, baş keser' ('Whoever cuts a branch cuts a head'), originally a cautionary ecological metaphor that somehow evolved into the ultimate descriptor for an overbearing strongman.
“The first political party leader to be arrested since the September 12, 1980, military coup era after Selahattin Demirtaş.” The arrest of Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdağ was reported in the media with this headline. However, there is no other similarity that would warrant him being mentioned in the same sentence as Demirtaş. In fact, they belong to entirely different worlds and are entirely opposing figures. Özdağ has been in custody at Silivri Prison for a month since Jan. 21, 2025.
When Syria’s new foreign minister chose to go to Saudi Arabia and Qatar for his first international visits before coming to Turkey, the main opposition party criticized the government, asking why Asaad al-Shaibani did not choose to reciprocate the visits of the Turkish foreign minister who went to Damascus two weeks after the fall of the Assad regime. For experts, this was only natural since Syria is first and foremost an Arab country and prioritizing relations with Turkey would have caused irritation among Arab capitals. In addition, while Turkey is struggling with its own economic hardships, Syria’s new rulers need Gulf money to get the country on its feet.
Among the many challenges Turkey will face in Syria three stand out. The first stems from the Arab countries. The “Arab streets” are happy to see the end of the suffering of Syrian Arabs at the hands of a dictator. Yet this joy is hardly shared by their rulers. The survival of the Assad regime symbolized the failure of the Arab uprisings of 2011 as Arab leaders feared the movement of political Islam could hit home to challenge their rule.
The Syrian opposition's major advances in the last ten days, especially the capture of Aleppo, the second biggest city in Syria, caught not only the international community off guard but also surprised Syrians themselves. The opposition launched Operation “Deterrence of Aggression” on Nov. 27 to end the regime’s attacks on its strongholds in northwest Syria and facilitate the return of at least one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their towns in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. These towns had been captured by the regime in 2020 in violation of the Astana Process agreed upon by Turkey, Russia, and Iran. The operation successfully achieved its planned objectives within the first four days. However, everything that has occurred since then has been unplanned and unexpected.
President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the helm in Washington DC will certainly affect the future orientation of NATO and have implications for American-Turkish security perceptions. The first term was occasionally stormy as President Trump publicly blamed NATO allies over a number of concerns and even threatened to pull out of the alliance. This time, he is coming back stronger than ever. The number one guiding factor of Trump's foreign policy is purely America's interests and he was not happy with the Europeans' reliance on American forces and money.
“When good bureaucrats retire, they go to Istanbul,” quipped a Turkish diplomat at his farewell dinner several years ago. He was about to join the steady flow of ex-ambassadors and senior officials who settle comfortably into Istanbul’s glamorous private sector. While these bureaucrats enjoy Istanbul’s cosmopolitan delights and lucrative board positions, politicians with unsatisfied ambitions would do well to think twice. The graceful transition from bureaucracy-laden Ankara to Istanbul’s cultural and economic limelight might be liberating—but for politicians, it often signals the end of the line. Take Abdullah Gül, who leads the parade of high-profile politicians who found themselves in Istanbul once their grip on Ankara slipped. Gül, the soft-spoken Number Two to Erdoğan at the founding of AKP, left the presidency in 2014 with considerable bitterness, feeling sidelined by Erdoğan and his team. Settling first in Tarabya’s Presidential Palace and then in a private villa in Beykoz, he became a figure whom former allies and even foes sought out for advice on new parties, and periodically as a possible challenger to Erdoğan. Yet, Gül never took the plunge, proving that the view from Istanbul is often one of wistful distance from real political clout.
İmam nikahı, or dini nikah (religious wedding), has long been a battleground for women’s rights activists who strongly oppose religious marriage and support strict penalties for imams and muftis (Muslim clergy) who conduct religious unions without first ensuring that the couple has undergone a civil ceremony. Turkey’s laws on marriage are regulated by the 1926 Civil Code, which abolished polygamy, introduced civil marriage, and mandated that any religious ceremony—should citizens of the newly established secular state choose to hold one—must follow civil registration in a municipal office. In villages, chieftains (elected officials) conduct the ceremony, while consular officers perform civil ceremonies for Turks abroad. Under the 1926 laws, religious officers—whether imams, priests, or rabbis in Turkey’s multi-faith society— had no authority to perform official weddings, as they cannot verify the legal requirements, such as the age of the would-be spouses or whether they are already married.