ERDOĞAN REAPS BENEFITS OF HIS GOOD TIES WITH TRUMP
The most important foreign policy development of this week was incontestably U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria during his visit to Saudi Arabia.
Analysis
Smart, independent reporting on Turkey's politics, economy and foreign affairs.
The most important foreign policy development of this week was incontestably U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria during his visit to Saudi Arabia.
The Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been on the radar of those who follow international relations due to two recent developments. Traditionally, the Central Asian Republics, rich in natural resources in a geo-strategic location, have been in the Russian sphere of influence and Russia still tries to exert dominance over them. However, nearly all have started to diversify their relations with third countries and regional groupings such as China, the U.S., the EU and Turkey.
The cancellation of the Istanbul mayor’s diploma, followed by his arrest, came two days after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke on the phone with U.S. President Donald Trump. For many, this was not a coincidence. This telephone conversation was underreported, according to Steve Witcoff. “Good news is coming from Turkey,” added Trump’s special envoy on March 22, when thousands had taken to the streets to protest the blatant assault against Turkish democracy.
Turkish-Russian relations have their own dynamics. Yet, it goes without saying that Turkey’s relations with the West have always influenced them. The deterioration in relations with the West usually is followed by an improved relationship with Moscow and vice versa. But while Turkey’s relations with the West have taken a nosedive in the past decade, one cannot say Ankara and Moscow have been on a honeymoon during that period. Still, there is no doubt that the Kremlin has managed its relations with Ankara much better than the West managed its relationship with its ally Turkey.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 12 sent shockwaves throughout Europe. “Everyone was expecting Trump to approach Putin; what shocked Europe was Trump’s positive attitude towards the Russian leader,” a Turkish diplomat told me.
The phrase of the moment in Turkey is “abesle iştigal,” the very expression that the country’s word-savvy Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan used to dismiss U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan to "take over Gaza" and transform it into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” In the colorful mosaic of Turkish, “abesle iştigal” conveys the sheer futility of engaging in pointless endeavors. The expression is even featured in Lûgat365, a project dedicated to preserving beautiful but near-forgotten words in Turkish.
Turkey, a major fossil fuel importer, will walk a fine line as Donald Trump’s return to the presidency sees the U.S. reviving its “energy dominance” policy—a policy widely anticipated to disrupt global energy dynamics. Characterized by ramping up fossil fuel production and expanding energy exports, the restored agenda, now under the new Energy Secretary Chris Wright, a prominent figure in the petroleum industry, will double down on fossil fuels, reversing the Biden administration’s renewable energy priorities.
Two issues will be of priority in Turkish foreign policy in 2025: post-Assad Syria and the war in Ukraine. Both will be closely linked to the policy preferences of the U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. As the U.S. leader is expected to stop the war in Ukraine, Turkey will be watching his efforts closely and will seek a role to facilitate a reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia, and between Moscow and the West.
For some in Turkey whoever wins the White House in next week’s elections, it won’t make much difference. It might not be that simple. It is no secret that ever since the failed coup attempt in 2016, there has been bad blood between Ankara and the Democrats in Washington. The view that part of the U.S. establishment was close to the Gülenist movement and the lukewarm reaction shown to the coup attempt reinforced the conviction among AKP elites that had the coup succeeded, Washington was not going to shed tears for the toppling of the government.